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# Commitment in American Foreign Policy

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TERRY L. DEIBEL

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**COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN FOREIGN  
POLICY,**

**A Theoretical Examination for the  
Post-Vietnam Era**

by  
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Adjunct Research Fellow  
Research Directorate

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Foreword.....	v
Preface .....	vii
About the Author .....	ix
<i>THIS report examines</i>	
I The Changing Structure of US Security Commitments <i>and provides</i> .....	1
II Defining Commitment in the American Experience.....	7
III The Theoretical Analysis of Commitment.....	13
Formal/Legal .....	13
Physical .....	14
Behavioral .....	17
Psychological .....	19
IV A Survey of Current American Commitments.....	27
Category Analysis: A Horizontal Perspective.....	28
Country Analysis: A Vertical Perspective .....	39
Far East, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand.....	39
Western Europe, Turkey, Spain, Yugoslavia.....	44
Africa, Nigeria, South Africa.....	47
Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia.....	49
V Conclusions and Disclaimers: The Limits of Theory.....	61

## LIST OF TABLES

1. Commitment Levels and Categories.....	10
2. Data on American Commitments.....	63
3. Data on American Commitments: Ranking by Indicator.....	65
4. Data on American Commitments: Ranking by Level and Subcategory .....	67
5. American Commitment to Ten Selected Countries: Ranking by Strength .....	61

## FOREWORD

The rapid pace of change in our international and domestic environments complicates the problem of developing timely national security policy and programs. Occasionally, the product of scholarly research provides useful insights into national security issues by combining a relevant theoretical framework with empirical analysis. An example is this monograph by Dr. Terry Deibel; it examines one of the more complex, but often oversimplified, areas of US interest: the formation of security commitments.

The United States currently has formal security relationships with over forty nations, and implicit commitments to many more. The desirability of these security relationships has been called into question in the post-Vietnam era, as the United States reassesses its international role and seeks a more flexible and pragmatic approach. This kind of examination can be facilitated by a systematic analytical approach to discern the extent of our commitments and to identify those which best serve our salient national interests.

In this study, Dr. Deibel develops a theoretical framework for classifying and analyzing foreign security commitments. He elaborates that framework through an empirical analysis of current US commitments to selected countries, thereby suggesting how such past and future involvement might be evaluated. This approach also illustrates that the complex interrelationships of many variables affect the evolution and strength of security relationships, and points out that commitments may evolve—subtly, informally and incrementally—without specific design, but with a binding force. The interesting approach developed by Dr. Deibel in this study should assist defense planners and others interested in US national security in placing security relationships in a perspective relative to the Nation's security interests and objectives.



R. G. GARD, JR.  
Lieutenant General, USA  
President

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## PREFACE

My concern with the structure and analysis of US security commitments grew, like the foreign policy interests of so many of my generation, out of my coming of age during the Vietnam War. I came late to oppose the war, not from any disagreement with its purpose or from resistance to the power of the Federal Government to require my service in its grisly fulfillment, but because I came to see that the war's likely contribution to the national interest could in no way justify its outrageous cost in human, economic, societal, and even national security terms. At the same time, I became intellectually fascinated by the deterioration of reason to which the emotional debate on the war drove both sides. The pro-war argument, for example, that US power was sufficient to beat the north if only domestic protest could be silenced, seemed to me to neglect the obvious truth that popular support of foreign policy is *part* of national power, especially in a democratic society and especially in wartime. I found equally facile the anti-war argument that because we could not win there was no need to win, that the North Vietnamese who would prevail were really benign nationalists who should prevail because they wished only freedom from all foreign influence and peace with all their neighbors. And I was particularly puzzled by the maxim, accepted by many on both sides, that we had become entangled in the war through some kind of mysterious "commitment" that could never, ever be changed lest the whole basis of our national security come unglued. That way of thinking seemed to me equally irrational, and yet I often found myself entertaining similar ideas about the importance of confidence in America's word. It was a dilemma I felt worth exploring.

This monograph represents the preliminary results of that inquiry, which has occupied a considerable portion of my professional life for the past half-decade. I began with graduate students in the Master of Science in Foreign Service at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, where Dean Peter F. Krogh and Program Director Chester A. Crocker incautiously allowed me to structure a diplomatic history course around current policy concerns. There I was able to explore the nation's past reliance on freedom of action (and avoidance of commitment) as the major element in its national security policy. I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Dr. Thomas H. Hughes, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who in the summer of 1977 provided for the first time in my career the financial, research, and clerical support which allowed me to devote uninterrupted time to research and writing—truly a liberating experience. The theoretical framework at the heart

of this monograph was largely designed at Carnegie, in the analysis of strategies for decommitment then being pursued by the Carter administration in Africa and the Far East (discussed in my *Foreign Policy* article of spring, 1978). During 1978-79, when I was Visiting Professor of Foreign Affairs at The National War College, Commandant John C. Barrow and his staff encouraged my interest in elaborating the theoretical framework into an empirical analysis of current US security commitments, and their experienced library staff (particularly Ms. Mary Threadgill) was most helpful in the arduous task of data collection. Although the present monograph was mostly written during that year, I must also acknowledge the Council on Foreign Relations, which supported me as an International Affairs Fellow during the last month or so of its drafting. Finally, I was fortunate to enjoy the capable assistance of Evelyn Lakes and Colonel Franklin Margiotta of the National Defense University Research Directorate in bringing my academic scribblings from pad to press.

If, in spite of the assistance of all those above, the reader should detect in what follows any error of commission or omission, he need not engage in lengthy speculation as to its source. *Mea culpa*.

Terry L. Delbel  
2 November 1979

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Terry L. Deibel is a foreign affairs analyst, writer, and teacher who holds a bachelor's degree from Ohio Wesleyan University, the diploma of the Institute of Advanced International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, and masters and doctoral degrees from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. In the early 1970's he worked for the International Division of the Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, leaving there in 1973 to become Assistant Professor of International Affairs, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. He has directed research projects for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on matters as diverse as public diplomacy and US security commitments, and since 1977 has been a policy analyst for the Unicorn Group, Ltd., an international assets management firm based in New York. Dr. Deibel has published in French and English for such journals as *The Washington Papers*, *Foreign Policy*, *Politique Internationale*, and the *Christian Science Monitor*, and he is an occasional commentator for National Public Radio's evening news program "All Things Considered..." During the academic year 1978-79 he was Visiting Professor of Foreign Affairs at The National War College, and he is currently working for the Office of International Security Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, as an International Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Deibel is a member of the Ohio Wesleyan University Board of Trustees, the Executive Committee of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, and the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations.

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# **COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY**

## **A Theoretical Examination for the Post-Vietnam Era**

### **I. THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF US SECURITY COMMITMENTS**

On 3 February 1969, Senator Stuart Symington, then a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chaired by J. William Fulbright, announced a 2-year investigation of American security commitments abroad. The purpose, according to the final report, was to "make a detailed review of the international military commitments of the United States and their relationship to foreign policy."<sup>1</sup> Coming in the worst days of the Vietnam war, the investigation was one of the first systematic and intensive efforts to determine how the United States might become "committed" to such disastrous involvements and whether there were other Vietnam-like entanglements awaiting the American people. Of course, the Symington Subcommittee also had a second, constitutional goal: to make it clear that Vietnam and other dangerous foreign commitments were the result of an executive grown drunk with power and exercising it without the concurrence of the Congress. The hearings unearthed commitments assumed by Presidential fiat to Spain, Ethiopia, and other nations. Again and again the points were made: commitments are dangerous, the United States is overcommitted, and the reason is the abuse of Presidential power.<sup>2</sup>

**In a sense, the Symington Subcommittee hearings marked the official intellectual beginning of the retreat from Vietnam which has had so pervasive an impact on American foreign policy during the last decade.** The most profound and unambiguous changes have been on the internal scene, a dramatic swing in power away from the erstwhile "chief" executive to the various combinations of Congressmen who choose to interest themselves in foreign affairs. The War Powers Act of 1973 and the Case Act of 1972 (requiring transmittal of executive agreements to the Congress) are merely highlights of what we now know is a very deep and broad power fractionalization across the whole range of domestic as well as foreign policy issues. Although the Congress has generally failed to force the executive to use treaties

rather than executive agreements, to acquire a treaty-like veto over the latter, or to block objectionable executive agreements through denial of funds, the political ability of Congress to frustrate policy initiatives during the Carter years has hardly been in doubt.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, whatever history's verdict on the culpability of Congress for Vietnam, the responsibility of the legislative branch for today's foreign policy mistakes will be all too clear.

On the external side, however, the changes wrought by the Vietnam debacle have been far more ambiguous. There has not been a wholesale termination of the alliances linking the United States with 40-odd foreign nations, and in fact some of our ties—for example, with Korea and NATO—have been reaffirmed by recent policymakers. But one does have a profound sense of the old order breaking up, of the ice of the cold war cracking (if not melting) under the strain of new domestic and international economic pressures and the opportunities of triangular great power politics. The idea that security could only be found within the folds of one of the old bipolar alliances has, at least in the Western camp, given way to a more flexible situation. And many states have been enticed by this flexibility—or forced by doubts of American steadfastness—to redefine the requirements of their security in broader, yet looser terms.

Examples abound. The most dramatic changes have come in the Far East, where in 1969 the Nixon Doctrine warned US allies that the United States would no longer send troops to support its commitments. Since then some former allies have been lost to communism, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization has been disbanded, the strategic trust territory of Micronesia has been disintegrating into quasi-nationhood, and the United States has given notice that its defense treaty with the Republic of China will lapse on 1 January 1980. Similar though less obvious changes have taken place in American policy towards Latin America, where a US intervention à la the Dominican Republic in 1965 (or even in Chile in 1973) could not be used to prevent Nicaragua's Sandinistas from ousting President Anastasio Somoza. In Europe the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain tried to avoid creating a new American commitment. And in Africa, America's two historic quasi-allies—Ethiopia and Zaire—by far the largest postwar US aid recipients in sub-Saharan Africa, are quite obviously going separate ways.

**Thus, while the United States has not revoked all its alliances, far-reaching changes in the pattern of US commitments are in**

**progress.** And until recently it seemed likely that at least one more was on the way, for the Carter administration's original Korean policy indicated a desire to terminate or at least modify a major American security guarantee that is focused on a potentially dangerous military situation.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, some of the most creative diplomatic initiatives of the United States may require the establishment of *new* security commitments (in fact, if not in name) if they are to come to fruition. A final comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East may yet include American guarantees to Israel and Arab participants, and similar requirements may develop in southern Africa. Furthermore, in spite of the changes in world politics and American public opinion, commitments to foreign allies continue to be an important deterrent to growing Soviet military power. The administration's strengthening of NATO and its recent support of Thailand and North Yemen prove that some officials understand how carefully chosen commitments can have utility, even in the post-Vietnam era.<sup>5</sup>

**The conclusion seems inescapable, then, that the United States is undergoing a period of relatively rapid change in its overseas commitments. It is almost as certain that the changes will be extraordinarily difficult to manage. There will doubtless be good reason to dispense with many commitments and to acquire others—but the dropping of old ties will be dangerous abroad and the cementing of new ones difficult at home. New concepts of security will have to be fashioned and given credibility, both for the United States and its allies, as the old ties give way. If they are intelligently to manage the transformation, policymakers and the American people need at a minimum a framework of analysis which will describe comparatively the elements of commitment, explain the interactions between them, and show in the process how commitments are likely to be ended or begun.**

Unfortunately, the concept of commitment has not received the kind of attention from foreign affairs analysts necessary to this task. During the 1950's and 1960's political scientists produced a fair amount of material on military alliances, a broader phenomenon which includes a relatively narrow view of commitment, with particular attention to the manner in which alliance partners interact; and there is, of course, a sizeable and up-to-date literature on deterrence, one of the effects of commitment. But the character of commitment itself—the way commitments are formed and terminated, how their binding force is generated across a wide range of interstate contacts, and how one can reliably determine the existence and strength of a

commitment—these factors have been subject to little systematic treatment. For this purpose several branches of scholarship offer valuable insights.<sup>6</sup> In addition to the political scientists' work on alliances, deterrence, and bargaining, one can turn to the legal profession for analyses of the binding force of international treaty law and contractual obligation in municipal law. Economists have something to offer, particularly as concerns the various indicators of economic involvement. Psychologists have a lot to say about the psychology of personal, human commitment which has remarkable and fascinating relevance to the processes of national commitment. And philosophy, particularly its branch of ethics, can tell us a great deal about the moral issues involved in a process of commitment modification.

**The purpose of this study, then, is to lay out the rudiments of a multidisciplinary framework for the analysis of US international commitments.** First, an effort will be made to define commitment, generally and in the American experience. Next, a rough model will be offered, breaking commitment down into four levels and specifying the indicators of commitment in each. Along the way the various characteristics, effects, and dynamics of commitment will be explored. Finally, the model will be applied comparatively to see what can be determined from data about commitment in current US relationships with several countries in Europe, the Far East, the Middle East, and Africa.

## **I. ENDNOTES**

1. Cited in. Roland Paul, *American Military Commitments Abroad* (New Brunswick, NJ : Rutgers University Press, 1973), p. ix.
2. US, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Hearings* before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, 91st Cong., 2 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971). Hereinafter cited as Symington Subcommittee Hearings.
3. See Charles D. Stevens, "The Use and Control of Executive Agreements: Recent Congressional Initiatives," *Orbis* 20 (Winter 1977): 905-31, for a descriptive analysis.
4. See Terry L. Deibel, "A Guide to International Divorce," *Foreign Policy* 30 (Spring 1978): 17-35.

5. For recent developments in this regard see my article on "Les engagements mondiaux des États-Unis après le Vietnam," *Politique Internationale* 4 (Summer 1979): 23-43.

6. Works from the fields listed below are used extensively in what follows and cited there where appropriate.

## II. DEFINING COMMITMENT IN THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

Any attempt to define commitment must first deal with the fact that the word is used very broadly, even by foreign affairs professionals. People say, for example, that the United States is "committed" to a particular policy like detente, when they mean only that the administration has adopted that policy, not that the country is in any sense bound to it. Yet the dictionary definition of commitment speaks of the "pledging" or "binding" of an individual to a particular course of action, and a meaningful international commitment must include that element of promise. Commitment is the antithesis of freedom; the acid test of its existence is that some restriction be imposed on the committed nation's absolute freedom of action.<sup>1</sup> When the commitment at hand is a security guarantee, the limitation may be operationally defined as an "if . . . then" statement requiring some positive action in a future contingency. With regard to the Republic of Korea, for example, the mutual defense treaty provides that *if* an armed attack occurs, *then* the United States will act in some way to meet the common danger.

Though the requirement that a real commitment limit one's freedom of action sounds absolute, in fact psychologists warn us that commitment is always a matter of degree. We say, quite legitimately, that it is "strong" or "weak." In a security treaty, the degree of commitment is directly related to the character and the specificity of the "if" and the "then," the triggering cause requiring action by the committed party and the *response* it is pledged to make. Degree of commitment depends both on the certainty that the committed state will respond and on the extent of response promised.

As an example, look at the following clause from a Bismarckian treaty of alliance with the Austro-Hungarian Empire:

Should . . . one of the two Empires be attacked by Russia, the High Contracting Parties bind themselves to come to the assistance of each other with the whole military strength of their Empire.<sup>2</sup>

Now compare that with Article 5 of the NATO treaty:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an attack occurs, each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith . . . such action as it deems

necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.<sup>3</sup>

As the above examples suggest, the promised response may vary from an immediate declaration of war to a mere diplomatic protest, and it may be very definitely prescribed or left entirely to the respondent's decision at the time the triggering event occurs. That event, too, may be restricted to armed attack on a narrow geographic area, or it may be broadly defined to protect a regime or even a personality against any threat, direct or subversive, external or internal, including such modern forms as insurrection or infiltration.<sup>4</sup>

The language comparison above also illustrates an important historical generalization about American commitments. Compared to other nations, the United States has always been extremely reluctant to accept legal restrictions on its freedom of action of the kind traditionally embodied in security treaties. For reasons ranging from its relative geographical isolation in the nineteenth century to its enormous power in the twentieth, and from its laissez-faire economic philosophy to its intense belief in personal liberty, Americans have generally sought international security in international freedom and have often gone so far as to equate commitment with a loss of sovereignty.<sup>5</sup> Even in that great era of supposed commitment after World War II, when American alliances with nearly fifty countries were signed, the resultant treaties allowed the United States great flexibility in response. Indeed, their net effect was not one of restricting America's freedom of action but of extending its power to the farthest defense perimeter ever.<sup>6</sup>

This is not, it should be carefully noted, to argue that the whole idea of US commitment in the postwar world is a myth which can simply be explained away. Quite the contrary. For although one analyst concluded in 1970 that the United States has "no outstanding *de jure* commitment . . . to go to war in defense of any foreign nation or nations whatsoever,"<sup>7</sup> the country is committed to many nations across the globe by other than legal means. In fact, the reluctance of the United States to undertake legal commitments has meant that its real pledges are usually not given in treaty form. In NATO, for example, the US commitment depends mainly on American leadership of the organized command and the presence of American troops in Europe, actions taken after the Korean war made the possibility of armed attack seem real; it does not depend on the 1949 language of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, signed a year before the Korean attack. With Israel there is no treaty at all, and yet many

unofficial observers would be at least as certain of an American response to an armed attack on Israel as to one on treaty-protected South Korea.

The American penchant for making commitments outside or alongside of the treaty process naturally makes their analysis far more complex. If commitment means a loss of freedom of action vis-a-vis another state, then a search for commitment must identify all those aspects of US overseas relationships that can create such a loss by predisposing us to act in defense of another country at some time in the future. To put it another way, we must try to specify those elements of our relations with another nation which can bind us in some degree to assist it if it is threatened, and to analyze the ways in which—singly or in combination—their binding force can be generated. At a minimum, this approach will provide a means of discovering what commitments the United States actually has and where the strength of those commitments is concentrated. On that basis it should be possible to approach their modification realistically.

**In fact, almost any aspect of our relationship with a country that gives us a real or perceived interest in its preservation may be considered the source of a commitment. Since commitment itself is a matter of degree, it is often very difficult to say where involvement with another nation has reached the level of commitment; the one often seems to shade into the other. Taken individually, most of the pieces of a relationship probably will not be significant, but their force in combination and over time may be additive. It is useful for purposes of analysis to group these aspects of interstate relations into categories on the basis of the way in which they generate the binding force necessary to commit. These categories can then be seen as levels of commitment, each interacting with the others in a characteristic way, some of which are active in their binding effect, others passive, with still others catalytic. Four category/levels and the relational elements which comprise them are displayed in Table 1 as a guide to the discussion which follows.**



**TABLE 1. Commitment Levels and Categories**

**I. Legal/Formal**

1. Treaties or executive agreements
2. Executive policy statements or letters
3. Congressional action

**II. Physical**

**A. Military**

4. US troops stationed abroad
5. American overseas bases
6. Participation in joint defense organizations and planning

**B. Economic**

7. Importance as a US customer
8. Key commodity supplied to the United States
9. US direct private investment in country
10. Foreign debt held by private American citizens and institutions
11. Foreign debt held by US Government

**C. Personal**

12. US citizens living abroad

**III. BEHAVIORAL**

13. High-level political interaction
14. Current annual trade (both directions)
15. Current military and economic aid
16. Total economic and military aid since World War II
17. Past response to cause

#### **IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL**

18. US population with ethnic ties abroad
19. Leadership perceptions of vital interests
20. Public perceptions of vital interests
21. Public willingness to respond
22. Contentious or linkage issues

## II. ENDNOTES

1. Schelling says this by describing the commitment process as one of "surrendering and destroying options," and bargaining theory has long recognized this as a key method of negotiation. See *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 44.
2. Austro-German Alliance of 7 October 1879, cited in G. A. Kertez, ed., *Documents in the Political History of the European Continent, 1815-1939* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 209.
3. Cited in Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., *The Record of American Diplomacy*, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 734.
4. In a 1960 executive agreement the United States reaffirmed its "opposition to any activities threatening the territorial integrity of Ethiopia." Symington Subcommittee Hearings, vol. II, p. 1905.
5. Senate action on the League of Nations Covenant in 1919-1920 remains the best example.
6. Paul Schroeder has developed the theme that many alliances since the Napoleonic era have been used for control of the international system in the interests of peace rather than as power aggregations for war. See his "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp. 227-262.
7. David Fromkin, "Entangling Alliances," *Foreign Affairs* 48 (July 1970): 690.

### III. THE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF COMMITMENT

#### Formal/Legal

Formal commitments—those set down explicitly in writing or oral statements—are the first and most obvious category, though hardly (as we have seen) the most important in the American experience. The binding force of international law has been a subject of scholarly debate for centuries, shifting with the political basis of the international system from divine imposition to the current positivist doctrine that a state can be bound only with its consent. At first glance such a legal description seems at odds with the loss of freedom of action involved in commitment, for how can a state exercise consent if it is bound? The paradox is resolved by the element of time; once consent is given, the state's intentions are for a time thereafter suspended.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the requirement of consent is perfectly compatible with the idea of loss of freedom, and in exposing the paradox the law teaches the valuable lesson that no commitment can be imposed on a state from outside. Individuals (like Congressmen) in a political collectivity may feel "trapped" by commitments made by others (say, the President) acting in its name, or those running the nation may not realize they are creating a commitment by their actions. But commitments of all kinds are created by the committed party; commitment is *never* involuntary.<sup>2</sup>

**Who can commit a state legally, of course, is of no concern to international law. Hence, from the international point of view, a treaty, an executive agreement, or even a secret letter from one head of state to another are equally valid.<sup>3</sup> It is up to the municipal, especially the constitutional, laws of each state to specify how consent to be bound shall be registered, so there may well be disparities between the international and the domestic legal effects of a given document. Within the United States the binding force of a formal commitment is enhanced in direct proportion to the number of legal bases touched in our system of checks and balances. Treaties (Indicator 1 on the Table) are the most dependable because of the requirement for Senate consent, which is lacking in executive agreements. Executive policy statements (#2) and congressional actions (#3), though unilateral in nature and thereby lacking force in international law, may have considerable domestic power—especially if they are paired (as was the case in the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1956).**

There are three factors in addition to constitutional completeness which affect the binding force of formal commitments. One, noted above, is specificity of language: how precisely is the triggering event defined, and what exactly does the document say the promised response will be? Another is currency, since any treaty tends to lose force over time, particularly if it has no termination date and international conditions are changing rapidly.<sup>4</sup> Everyone appreciates that a recent promise is better than one made long ago, so US Presidents and Secretaries of State often find themselves jetting from capital to allied capital reaffirming America's determination to honor old treaties and defend old allies. Finally, publicity is a key element in international as in personal commitment. A man who has determined to give up smoking will be far more likely to succeed if he tells all his friends about the decision, for the obvious reason that failure would be publicly embarrassing and costly in terms of others' respect for him. Some psychologists even go so far as to claim that it is impossible to be committed in private, and it is obvious that considerations of national prestige and honor are best brought into play by loudly trumpeted promises.<sup>5</sup> This lesson is one appreciated for opposite reasons by Bismarck, who kept his alliances secret in order to preserve flexibility, and by some US allies today, who mention old American treaties at every opportunity in a studied effort to keep the United States committed.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, while a commitment cannot be created by the party to whom it is given, that party can marginally affect the commitment's strength by a variety of policy actions that emphasize the ties between it and the committing state.

### **Physical**

Grouped at the second level are indicators of physical commitment, so called because they are ongoing situations of fact which tend to make the response virtually automatic when the triggering event occurs. The most powerful of these situations of fact are various forms of US military force stationed on foreign soil (#4). The so-called "tripwire" function of American troops stationed in Europe and South Korea is probably the best example: if an armed attack occurs, American soldiers in these trouble spots will almost certainly die, thus presumably involving the United States automatically in the subsequent conflict. The Symington Subcommittee was clearly of the opinion that "the authority of the President to station troops abroad and establish bases in foreign countries" (#5) could commit the United States, and it recommended that the executive should do neither without prior authorization from

Congress.<sup>7</sup> In 1969 the Senate as a whole defined commitment along these lines:

A national commitment [it resolved in S. Res. 85] means the use of the armed forces of the United States on foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign country, government, or people by the use of the armed forces or financial resources of the United States, either immediately or upon the happening of certain events.<sup>8</sup>

Participation in a joint defense organization like NATO or in bilateral defense planning (#6) can have a profound committing effect, especially once battle plans and force deployments are predicated on mutual support. One of the most famous commitments in history resulted from Britain's agreement, in secret naval discussions before World War I, that in case of war she would defend the English Channel. When war broke out in August 1914 the French fleet had been entirely deployed to the Mediterranean, leaving France utterly defenseless unless the British fulfilled their promises.<sup>9</sup> The Symington Subcommittee concluded that:

. . . overseas bases, the presence of elements of United States armed forces, joint planning, [or] joint exercises . . . represent to host governments more valid assurances of United States commitment than any treaty or agreement.

Additionally, Senators felt that such physical presence was increasingly sought by foreign governments in addition to formal commitments<sup>10</sup>

Another broad group of elements generating physical commitment are economic in nature, although by no means all economic ties have binding force. Here one must choose one's indicators carefully. The mere existence of a trading relationship does not create a physical commitment unless the flow in one direction or the other is indispensable to national well-being. Hence, an important market abroad (#7), as Western Europe was perceived to be in the days before the Marshall Plan, or an economy with exclusive control of a vital commodity (#8), such as Zairian cobalt or Saudi oil, may contribute to a reflexive response to protect the political entities controlling them. Of course, these factors may have far less binding power than those of a military character discussed earlier. Still, Americans have often relied on just such elements of economic dependency on the part of other states to accomplish extreme foreign policy goals. The Confederate States of America, for example,

thought that England's eighty percent dependence on southern cotton so committed her to the Confederate cause that she could be brought into the Civil War as a full belligerent by a cotton embargo. The error of that assumption was the South's most important diplomatic contribution to its own defeat.<sup>11</sup>

**Far more powerful than these trade factors in creating an automatic response is the physical presence in a foreign country of American citizens (#12) and property likely to be endangered by threats to their security.** Humanitarian intervention, springing from a state's duty to protect its nationals' lives and property wherever they may be, has long been recognized as a justifiable use of force in international law. Although ostensibly such rescue missions are without broader policy intent, they have very often developed into full-scale actions with goals involving the local regime. In terms of binding power the tripwire function of civilians is almost as automatic as that of troops; few democratic governments can ignore vengeful domestic public opinion. Recognizing this, when foreign situations are obviously dangerous (as recently in Lebanon, Iran, or Afghanistan), governments often direct their nationals to leave and publicly renounce their intent to protect them if they choose to remain. However, even in the presence of an explicit security guarantee, military or civilian casualties are not necessarily sufficient for automatic intervention, as the deaths a few years ago of American soldiers along the Korean DMZ prove.<sup>12</sup> Everything depends on whether a connection is made between the terms of the formal guarantee and the actions resulting in loss of life, and that in turn is related to the general political atmosphere and the effect of other levels of commitment.

Loss of property, of course, is viewed far less seriously by public opinion than loss of life; therefore, even a high level of direct investment in a foreign country (#9) can be expected to create less binding force than human presence there. Still, its importance is attested to by past nationalization furors (the ITT/Chile case is in point), and US investment is felt by many analysts to have been a key factor limiting America's policy in southern Africa over the years. The committing power of foreign investments seems roughly proportional to the influence over government policymakers enjoyed by the groups holding them; so, Marxian rhetoric aside, this factor probably varies with administrations and Congresses. It seems plausible, for example, that the Republican administrations of Richard Nixon or Gerald Ford would have reacted differently than that of Democrat Jimmy Carter to the Shaba invasions of 1977 and 1978. The same sort

of generalizations would apply to a foreign debt held by American citizens or their government (#10 and #11), which creates a vested interest in repayment that would be compromised by a security threat. Whether public or private debt creates more binding force is a difficult issue, but it seems likely that public funds—owned by everyone and therefore by no one—would generate less binding force than private funds—where a clear proprietary interest is felt and may be exercised by well-connected individuals and corporations. Recent perceptions of the vulnerability of the American banking system due to overexposure overseas has just brought to light aggregate data which enables comparisons of this key factor.<sup>13</sup>

### **Behavioral**

The third level of commitment, here labeled behavioral, is perhaps the most difficult to ascertain with certainty and explain with clarity. The concept, and the name, point to the psychologists' contention that the binding force of personal commitments arises from the effect of repeated, explicit behavior on the individual performing it.<sup>14</sup> Psychologists argue that most people attribute beliefs to themselves based on their own actions, just as they do to others: how can I know what I really believe until I see what I do? is one way of putting it. This is a difficult point to grasp, for although it is obvious that actions speak louder than words about *other* people's beliefs and other states' policies,<sup>15</sup> it is awkward to consider that a person's or a nation's *own* behavior partially determines what he or it is committed to rather than the other way around. Behavior leads to commitment partly because of man's need to conceptualize, explain, and justify his actions to himself. Attitudes held in the confines of one's mind are easy to change; one can even deny to himself ever having thought in a given way. But behavior cannot be erased by a mental act this side of sanity, and in that sense one is committed by it. Behavior thus becomes self-sustaining through the mechanism of commitment: the behavior tends to commit, and commitment is then reflected in a pattern of consistent behavior.

Look, for example, at our friend who is giving up smoking. At the behavioral level he is likely to believe himself committed to quitting, not when he privately decides to do so nor even when he tells others about his decision, though this latter step may have behavioral significance (beyond its publicity value) as a secondary or symbolic action. No, he is committed behaviorally only when he actually begins cutting back of his own free will. Moreover, the more he cuts back, the more committed he becomes—that is, the more he observes himself



smoking less the more firmly his self-image becomes that of a man kicking the habit. Other factors connected with his behavior intervene, too: as his investment (measured in withdrawal pain endured) increases and the benefits (of feeling better) begin to appear, the cost/benefit ratio of reverting to old habits alters. Habit and the force of cognitive inertia then play a role in maintaining the commitment after the behavior is essentially changed.

**How does all this apply to interstate commitments? It means that almost any state action which seems to reflect a commitment can create one in the minds of policymakers observing their own and the nation's behavior.** Thus, on the economic side a substantial amount of trade in both directions (#14) creates the impression of a close relationship between the two countries; large flows of tourists or cultural and educational exchange can have the same effect. High levels of current economic and military aid (#15) are often a part of an overall security commitment, as President Carter's recent promises of military aid to South Korea are intended to emphasize.<sup>16</sup> Similarly, a great deal of political interaction between high officials of two governments (#13), besides providing occasion for the inevitable reiteration of legal pledges, is obviously a measure of the extent of mutual involvement of the two nations.

Since the repetition of behavior adds to the sense of commitment, long-standing patterns of historical interaction between states are especially valuable indicators of behavioral commitment. A sizeable "investment" of military and economic aid in a country over the course of many years (#16) does not create a physical commitment in the way that direct investment or debt does—one does not "own" the aid given years ago, and expected repayments have separate committing effects from those occasioned by the original granting of aid loans. But a substantial record of aid is important for the simple reason that it represents a policy investment which is extremely difficult to write off politically and intellectually. Politically, officials are tempted to throw in more resources and determination to justify the resources and political capital already expended on a bad policy, rather than cutting their losses through an embarrassing policy reversal. Intellectually, as noted above, the process is far more insidious and complex, as the officials' and the nation's policy image becomes fixed—almost unconsciously—by the observance of past behavior. One need only think of Vietnam in order to appreciate the overpowering impact of this process, as psychologist Charles Kiesler may have been in the following statement:

Often the behavior of our government, both militarily and diplomatically, consists of a series of relatively small, discrete acts, each of which is a specific response to a specific situation, unimportant by itself and not dictated by large policy. However, later when a crisis appears on the scene, the government finds itself with a policy that is dictated by these smaller actions. . . . One can think of the smaller actions as commitments which, although innocuous at the time, summate to freeze one's position when the crisis . . . forces a review of official policy.<sup>17</sup>

One might assume that the best evidence of a behavioral commitment would be an actual past performance of some act of support for a nation that had been threatened or attacked, a real response to a triggering cause (#17). For example, the fact that the United States responded to an armed attack on South Korea in the summer of 1950, and the behavioral imprint of the blood and treasure expended in that conflict, might lead one to presume that the United States would react in similar fashion if another attack occurred. But a couple of warnings must be entered. First, the response to attack by itself is not sufficient to prove that a commitment existed when the attack took place. All foreign policy actions are not predetermined by commitment, so the response may have been (and in the Korea case apparently was) simply a decision freely taken at the time.<sup>18</sup> Second, insofar as the decision to intervene and the war which followed may be seen to have created a behavioral commitment, its binding effect (like that of formal commitments) may well be weakened by the passage of 25 years since the war's end. Historical data are important, then, primarily as evidence of a *continuing* pattern of interaction which connects the earlier behavior with current policy.

### **Psychological**

The fourth level on which commitment exists is the psychological. In a sense, all commitment ultimately rests on this foundation; for (as any divorcee would attest) none of the externally binding factors discussed above can prevail for long unless the nation believes in its promise. No matter how severely the nation's freedom of action may be limited by a given commitment, the response is not automatic in the way that, for example, the classical gold standard equilibrated the international monetary system of 200 years ago through its direct impact on domestic price levels. A governmental decision must always be made when the triggering event occurs. From that perspective all the factors in Table 1 are significant to the degree that they predispose the decisionmaker to feel committed in the hour of crisis. In the final analysis the responsible officials will

have to decide whether a response (and hence the commitment) really seems in the national interest. Perceptions of the value of the commitment to the national interest are what the psychological level is all about.

As a practical matter, a democracy's perception of its national interest in a given commitment can only be conjured up weakly from a host of disparate indicators. Public opinion polls (#19, 20, and 21) are one key piece of the puzzle, but they should be reinforced by other evidence, such as the tone of editorial opinion in leading newspapers from around the country. Some estimation of overseas cultural ties must be made, including the ethnic representation of a foreign country in the American electorate (#18) as a powerful potential influence on Congress and the President: the Israeli case is a primary example. Of equal importance are the perceptions of key leaders in Congress and the executive which are discernible through polls, public statements, or legislative voting patterns. Also important may be major political issues arising between the committed country and its ally (#22), either of a contentious nature (which may pollute the relational atmosphere and tend to divide the two countries) or of a friendly kind (which may highlight their partnership and reinforce the bonds linking them). Of course, the most thorough research can never certainly probe the intricacies of national perceptions or predict how their various elements may interact when a crisis strikes. The limits of analysis, apparent throughout, are especially obvious here.

**That commitment is in the end a psychological phenomenon leads to several other points which should be made before concluding this sketch of levels of commitment.** One is that, for a nation as for a person, key commitments are very close to the center of personality. As limits on freedom, they define identity by stating the parameters of action. They are special kinds of decisions in that they set the rules for many other decisions, in the way that constitutional law specifies the creation of other laws. Intellectually they often have the effect of freezing one's cognitive world, causing decisionmakers to reject information which contradicts the premises upon which the commitment is based. Emotionally their importance is such that the "cognitive dissonance" created by such contrary information can lead to high levels of stress and dysfunctional action before the agony of breaking old commitments and forming new ones is undergone.<sup>19</sup> These facts not only go to show the centrality of commitment to the foreign policy process; they also explain anew why international commitments can be so difficult to change for substantial periods of

time, yet can then change with breathtaking rapidity (as was the case with US policy towards the People's Republic of China).

The resistance of commitments to change is also caused by a second set of psychological factors, those relating to the effects of commitment. The man who commits himself to quit smoking or to run five miles a day affects no one else. But the sort of commitments we have been discussing are analogous to marriage vows in their effects on the nations to whom we commit; they profoundly affect their sense of identity, too. Often, as in the case of the formal North Atlantic Treaty commitment of 1949, the primary effect has been to create the confidence needed for the restoration and maintenance of national life. Hence the "crises of confidence" that are feared from US renunciation of one or another of its commitments. For states like West Germany, or especially South Korea or Taiwan, which lack their own prior government history, the psychological impact of American commitment goes much deeper, and the demands change would impose come close to finding an entirely new international identity. Also, as Schelling points out, the commitments of a given country are psychologically interdependent: termination or failure to honor one raises doubts about the validity of the others, even though the practical effect may have been to increase the ratio between the committed state's resources and its remaining commitments.<sup>20</sup>

Ironically, the maintenance of allied confidence depends on yet another psychological factor, the effect of commitment on third parties, which is generally called deterrence. Given the multiplicity of factors discussed above, it is not difficult to argue the uncertainty of both enemy deterrence and the allied confidence based on it. Not only can commitments not be imposed on a country from outside, but other nations--and even the committed state itself--cannot be sure of what commitments it holds. It follows that there is no necessary correlation between what another state believes American commitments to be and what they actually are, and that the United States may appear committed when it is really not or uncommitted when it really is.<sup>21</sup> Since the effects of commitment depend on them, these putative differences between US intentions and other states' perceptions are clearly matters of real significance. In fact, one can argue that the United States was dragged into no less a conflict than World War II because Japan misperceived the United States as committed to defend British supply lines in Southeast Asia, in spite of President Roosevelt's explicit refusal to be so bound.<sup>22</sup> Of all the levels of commitment, the psychological one remains the most vital.

In conclusion, and before illustrating the uses of this model of commitment through data on some concrete cases, a few generalizations can be made about the interaction between these various levels. First, formal commitments alone are not enough today (if ever they were) to cement a binding tie between nations, nor are they essential to such a tie; but they remain very important as a catalytic agent for the other levels. High degrees of either physical or behavioral commitment, particularly the former, may alone do the trick, but the formal tie makes those other two levels far stronger than they would be in isolation. Second, although psychological commitment alone is so important that little else is needed, it is difficult to imagine it being sustained for long without at least moderate behavioral ties. Finally, an emphasis on one level of commitment can to some extent make up for deficiencies on another level, but radical variations in the degree of commitment between levels is cause for concern. For example, a legal pledge based on a strong physical and behavioral commitment but lacking psychological backing, as in the case of South Korea a year or two ago, may be exceedingly dangerous. On the other hand, a physical or behavioral commitment without formal language to back it up (as in the Middle East) may be a species of governmental dishonesty. In general one should look for a rough correspondence between levels.

### III. ENDNOTES

1. The question "For how long?" is discussed below.
2. This point seems on the face of it to be at odds with conclusions reached by political scientist Schelling and by psychologists Mann and Janis. Schelling states that the commitment process may not be deliberately conceived "and that commitments may be implicit," whereas Janis and Mann argue that personal commitment may come about involuntarily and in piecemeal fashion through nonvigilance on the part of the decisionmaker. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp. 51-52. Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment* (New York: Free Press, 1977), p. 287. In fact, both are talking about commitments that appear involuntary because they are gradual or disguised in some fashion; no person, or nation, can be trapped into a commitment if he wishes to avoid it, however much he may be forced to do things he does not want to do.
3. Is the United States bound by the secret Nixon-Phan van Dong correspondence of 1 February 1973, to provide Vietnam with postwar

aid? Henry Kissinger says no, but only because Vietnam broke its part of the deal. It was clearly a formal commitment in international law, though of doubtful validity in US law. See *Washington Post*, 20 July 1977.

4. Referring to the need for currency, Allen Whiting once stated that treaties are never abrogated, they just fade away. Jerome Alan Cohen, et al., *Taiwan and American Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 138. And Arie E. David states that most international agreements simply fall into desuetude because the parties lose interest. *The Strategy of Treaty Termination* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), p. 81 footnote.

5. See works by Charles Kiesler, Kurt Lewin, Leon Festinger, Irving Janis, and Leon Mann for this widely held view. It must be said that psychologists see three binding forces behind all personal commitment: real or utilitarian loss, social punishment, or self-disapproval, all or some of which would be suffered by breaking a commitment. Janis and Mann, *Decision Making*, chap. 11. Fear of social disapproval is obviously a function of publicity and is one of the most powerful of committing forces; on the international level, it relates to the confidence factor (discussed in section on *Psychological* commitment). Real loss appears on our physical level (discussed in section on *Physical* commitment), and self-disapproval on the behavioral level (treated in section on *Behavioral* commitment).

6. On Bismarck, see David, *Strategy of Termination*, p. 12.

7. Symington Subcommittee Hearings, vol. II, p. 2442.

8. Cited in Stevens, "Use and Control of Executive Agreements," p. 913 footnote.

9. See Barbara Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York: Dell, 1962), chap. 7, esp. p. 117.

10. Symington Subcommittee Hearings, Vol. II, pp. 2434-2435.

11. See Frank L. Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), chaps. 1 and 2.

12. Two were killed in the tree-trimming incident of 18 August 1976, and three more in a helicopter which was shot down by North Korea in its air space on 14 July 1977.
13. Investigations of aggregate overseas private debt of the US banking system are being conducted by the Federal Reserve Board, FDIC, and the Comptroller of the Currency.
14. The leading proponent of this view is Charles A. Kiesler, *The Psychology of Commitment* (New York: Academic Press, 1971).
15. See Schelling's arguments on tacit bargaining in *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960).
16. Carter, of course, was substituting or offsetting a reduction in one level of commitment (troops) with an increase in another (aid), though it is not clear that the White House understood this.
17. Kiesler, *Psychology of Commitment*, p. 73. Janis and Mann, *Decision Making*, p. 283, put it this way:

A heavy investment of time and energy often leads people to overrate a plan of action. After arriving at a decision that has required a great deal of cognitive work and emotional investment, a person is reluctant to admit to himself that his "baby" is defective, that all his hard work was futile and should be discarded. Furthermore, the weary policy-maker fresh from the conference table, like a combat veteran returned from the front, is in no mood to rethink decisions and allow "settled" conflicts to be reactivated. It is not just a matter of intellectual laziness, or of resistance to the idea of working again on the same problem, or of being bored by overfamiliar arguments. All of these factors may enter in; but an entirely different source of cognitive inertia arises after one announces his decision to others—namely, the threat of self-disapproval for violating one's self-image as an effective, reliable person who can be decisive and who can keep his word. Self-esteem is likely to become deeply implicated once a person says to others, "I have made my decision, and that is that; I don't intend to think about it any more." To avoid perceiving himself as weak-minded, vacillating, ineffectual, and undependable, the person turns his back on pressures to reconsider his decision and sticks firmly with his chosen alternative, even after he has started to suspect that it is a defective choice.

18. See Glenn D. Paige, *The Korean Decision* (New York: Free Press, 1968), and Ernest R. May, *"Lessons" of the Past* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), chap. 3. One could argue that the world situation (including the cold war) "committed" Truman to react as he did, but that would include the entire context in a way that would broaden commitment beyond its useful dimensions and imply that all decisions are predetermined. In fact, Truman had a wide range of choice, as May makes clear.

19. For cognitive freezing, see Kurt Lewin, "Group Decision and Social Change," reprinted in T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York: Holt, 1947), pp. 330-344. For cognitive dissonance, see Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), and *Conflict, Decision, and Dissonance* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

20. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 55; e.g., if the United States is overcommitted worldwide, the termination of the Taiwan treaty should make it more able to honor its treaty with Japan. But that is not, of course, how the Japanese see it.

21. Deibel, "Guide," p. 22.

22. See Herbert L. Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor* (New York: Atheneum, 1965), pp. 333-335.



#### IV. A SURVEY OF CURRENT AMERICAN COMMITMENTS

"Nothing is more practical," it has often been said, "than a good theory." Since the theoretical analysis above was most definitely designed to be useful, it should be possible to illustrate its practical value by applying it to some concrete cases.

Table 2 arrays the current data on American commitments to ten countries in Western Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. As is obvious, no effort has been made to cover all American commitments abroad. In particular, the major countries of Europe and the Far East have been omitted, since their security relationships with the United States are so close as to leave little doubt about the strength of the commitments involved. The intent was rather to pick nations of great foreign policy interest in each region, and especially those to which the American security commitment has been, or is likely to be, in the process of change.

In Western Europe, these criteria led to the choice of three countries: Spain, which is rapidly moving closer to NATO during the post-Franco period of democratization; Yugoslavia, of obvious importance as the post-Tito era continues its apparently interminable approach; and Turkey, unique among NATO countries in its combination of ambivalence towards the alliance and geopolitical importance. In the Far East, South Korea and Taiwan were selected as the two nations whose security ties to the United States are undergoing the most dramatic change. Thailand has also been included as the most clearly threatened ally in Indochina, which is the super-sensitive region of American commitment. Finally, in Africa and the Middle East, countries were deliberately chosen whose mutual antagonism on a crucial issue not only presents agonizing dilemmas for American policy but may even, in a period of crisis, force the United States to choose between them. In Africa the issue is apartheid and majority rule, arraying the Nigerians against the South Africans and black against white; in the Middle East it has become the Camp David treaty, viewed as a "separate" peace rather than as part of a comprehensive settlement and hence dividing Saudi Arabia and other Arab states from the new Israeli-Egyptian alignment. In each area the United States has decisive choices to make over the next few years which may well influence and be influenced by countervailing levels of commitment.

If the theoretical analysis above is kept in mind, the reader will find that the information presented in Table 2 really speaks for itself.

He is encouraged to examine it carefully, comparing the various indicators across levels of commitment for a single country and comparatively between countries in a given region. Space does not permit a complete written analysis for each nation, nor does it seem necessary. It might, however, be useful to discuss the data as it appears horizontally for each indicator, and then point out some of the more striking conclusions that emerge for each country. (The reader is referred also to endnote 1 on sources, which provides detailed information about the data and points out the many limitations inherent in this kind of varied data base.)

### **Category Analysis: A Horizontal Perspective**

**On the legal/formal level of commitment, the first requirement is to specify how many defense agreements the United States has with each country and whether the language in any of the agreements approximates the kind of binding pledge characteristic of an alliance (see Table 3, Indicator 1).** Here the highest level of commitment is clearly to South Korea, where the 1954 alliance is backed by fourteen implementation agreements. Turkey is almost equally protected, enjoying the North Atlantic Treaty guarantee backed by eleven agreements, while the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty gives Thailand considerable protection along with six extant executive agreements. On a considerably lower level are countries with some legal protection but lacking a clear defense pledge. For example, the new treaty with Spain stops short of a formal NATO-like commitment, but it does provide for "a defense relationship between Spain and the United States of America" that the parties will "harmonize . . . with existing security arrangements in the North Atlantic area." Further, a supplementary agreement considers the possibility of "actions which could be taken in the geographic area of common interest . . . in case of an attack against Spain or the United States in the context of a general attack against the West."<sup>2</sup> Much weaker language is the norm in the Middle East, where agreements with both Israel and Saudi Arabia contain similar references to participating or engaging in individual and collective self defense under the UN charter.<sup>3</sup> (The reference, of course, is to Article 51, under which fell the Vandenberg Resolution of 1948 and all subsequent US alliances of the 1950's.) Although Israel got the stronger formal pledge in collateral accords accompanying the Camp David treaty, the numerical edge in agreements for defense cooperation is clearly held by the Saudis. Finally, the defense alliance with Taiwan was to be abrogated on 1 January 1980, along with the legal disestablishment of the ten backup accords. Thus the

Taiwanese have been reduced to the traditional status of the African states and Yugoslavia, which have never had any formal defense pledges from the United States.

When it comes to executive statements and congressional action, the pattern sometimes reinforces—sometimes contradicts—that of legally binding agreements; and in some cases (of course) executive and congressional policies pull in opposite directions. Executive branch rhetoric (see Table 3, Indicator 2) clearly exceeds the treaty requirements for both Saudi Arabia and Israel, with the President declaring the defense of Israel as the United States predominant interest in the area and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown maintaining on several occasions that the United States will send troops if necessary to defend its supply of oil.<sup>1</sup> The President has made equally emphatic statements about South Korea and Thailand, two threatened states with which the United States has a defense treaty. President Carter wrote former President Park in 1977 that American “determination to provide prompt support to help the Republic of Korea defend against armed attack . . . remains firm and undiminished” in spite of plans to withdraw American troops, and he publicly told the Thai Prime Minister that the United States was “deeply committed to the integrity and to the freedom and the security of Thailand.” On a slightly lower level were the statements he made with regard to Taiwan (that the United States remained free to “go to war” to protect it) and with President Tito of Yugoslavia (that the United States supported that nation’s “independence, territorial integrity, and unity.”)<sup>5</sup> Turkey would also be about at this level; the lack of strong Presidential statements is more than compensated for by actions on the arms embargo repeal, intelligence operations and economic support. The President’s cryptic remark that the full participation of Spain in NATO “would strengthen the security of all” must be rated considerably lower, and this researcher has discovered no significant statements by this administration regarding the defense of either Nigeria or South Africa.<sup>6</sup> It should be noted, too, that the statements on Saudi Arabia, Yugoslavia, Thailand, and Taiwan are all quite recent and represent a noticeable shift in administration policy during 1978-79 towards reassertion of American overseas commitments.<sup>7</sup>

Whether a parallel trend has been under way in the Congress is difficult to say (see Table 3, Indicator 3). The most dramatic congressional action has been to slow or even prevent administration moves aimed at reducing or terminating American commitments to South Korea and Taiwan. Congressional dissent, reinforced by sharply higher intelligence estimates on the size of the North Korean

Army, forced the administration to slow and then cancel its dramatic plans to withdraw troops from South Korea. In the Taiwan case, the Congress adopted language stating that the use of force against Taiwan would be of grave concern and that the United States would stay armed to prevent it, thus clearly demonstrating the continuation of congressional support for defending the island even in the absence of a treaty pledge to do so. On the other hand, the Congress was willing only by the closest of votes and after pitched legislative battles to repeal the arms embargo on Turkey it had passed after the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and it was equally reluctant to approve the package sale of military aircraft to (*inter alia*) Saudi Arabia; both were top-priority administration requests that deepened US commitments to those two countries. Finally, the Senate attached an explicit reservation to the 1976 treaty with Spain, declaring that it did "not expand the existing United States defense commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty area or create a mutual defense commitment between the United States and Spain."<sup>8</sup> If they reveal any consistent pattern, these disparate outcomes seem to show only that the Congress is a force for inertia, opposing change in the structure of American commitments regardless of whether its purpose is to enlarge or to restrict them.

Taken together, as shown in Table 4 (I), these first three indicators show a very strong legal commitment to South Korea and Turkey, with surprisingly an only slightly less potent commitment to Thailand. On a second and very broad level of legal commitment is Israel, followed by Saudi Arabia, then Taiwan (in spite of the treaty termination) and Spain; with all these nations there is some degree of formal commitment but not enough absolutely to bind the United States to respond if an attack should occur. Yugoslavia is a special case, without a clear commitment but yet not wholly unprotected either. Finally, it is impossible to detect any American legal commitment to North or South Africa.

Surveying the data with regard to physical commitment on the military level, the most binding of all, reveals a much sharper pattern (see Table 4, Indicators 4, 5, 6). With regard to three countries—South Korea, Spain, and Turkey—the military commitment is very substantial. Troops stationed in those countries, the number and size of military installations there, and the participation of the US Government in detailed command and military planning operations all make an American response to an attack nearly automatic. (For Korea this is especially true, since US forces there include ground troops stationed on the DMZ in tripwire position.) For most of the other countries on the chart the data reveal only a handful of military

personnel, engaged generally in liaison and assistance functions, with rather higher advisory concentrations in Thailand and Israel. The one significant exception is Saudi Arabia, which has a much higher level of US military personnel than the other countries in this class and also, in the US-Saudi Joint Military Commission, an ongoing organ of military consultation and planning. To be sure, the Saudis have reportedly refused offers to base American aircraft and other military strength on their territory and have displayed extreme reluctance to become too closely identified with the United States militarily. Nevertheless, American consideration of a rapid deployment force and augmentation of US naval activity in the Indian Ocean shows Washington's determination to prepare to defend the country without offending Saudi sensibilities.<sup>9</sup> Needless to say, such developments point to a significant and growing American military commitment to Saudi Arabia.

Physical commitment on the economic side is far more complex. None of the countries surveyed is really crucial as a market for American goods (see Table 3, Indicator 7), although Saudi Arabia is the most important as the eighth largest American customer taking 3 percent of all US exports. South Korea, Taiwan, Spain, and Israel are all of some importance as American markets, but hardly sufficiently so to influence a defense decision. Of greater significance is the matter of key commodities supplied by these countries to the United States (see Table 3, Indicator 8). Two, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, are oil suppliers, and since they are currently the United States two largest oil suppliers (providing 17 percent and 13 percent of total US imports, respectively) the significance of the fact can hardly be exaggerated.<sup>10</sup> The South Africans are also principal suppliers of vital US commodities, especially chromium ore or chromite, manganese, platinum group metals, and vanadium. The United States is about 40 percent dependent on South Africa for chromium and platinum group supplies, 10 percent dependent for manganese, and 20 percent for vanadium.<sup>11</sup> Loss of these commodity imports could be far more serious than the loss of markets, which might be replaceable elsewhere.

A glance at direct private American investment in the industry of these countries (see Table 3, Indicator 9) shows Spain and South Africa far out in front of all the others, with \$2.2 billion and \$1.8 billion respectively of American-owned plant and equipment. The recently booming economies of South Korea and Taiwan follow well behind in the \$400 million range, with Nigeria, Thailand, and Israel close behind them. No surprises here, except perhaps at the smallness of the US

stake in Israel and the size of it in Thailand. Nothing can be said, of course, about the size of American investment in Saudi Arabia, for the government refuses to reveal the data here in order to protect individual companies' privacy. But one suspects, given the volume of trade and other economic dealings, that it must be quite substantial.

Foreign debt held by American banks and the US Government presents yet another pattern, strongly influenced of course by the wealth of the nation in question and its history of US aid (see Table 3, Indicators 10 and 11). The indebtedness of Saudi Arabia and Israel to American banks is almost identical, but the \$4.2 billion Israeli debt to the US taxpayer has almost no Saudi counterpart. It is widely appreciated that if the Saudi Government dissolved in chaos the United States would lose oil, but this kind of debt means that if Israel were invaded by the Arabs the financial loss would also be of serious concern. South Africa has a debt pattern unbalanced in the opposite direction, with an indebtedness to American private banks of nearly \$2 billion but almost nothing owed the US Government. Bigger *total* debt positions are held by rapidly growing and/or partially industrialized countries like Korea (on top with a \$5.5 billion combined total), Spain (at \$4.6 billion), Taiwan (\$3.6 billion), and Turkey (\$3.3 billion). Yugoslavia, Thailand, and Nigeria follow at total levels—like the Saudis—of relative insignificance.

What can be said, in summary, about the United States need for (and likely willingness to defend) these countries on economic grounds (see the Indicators at II. B on Table 4)? Only Yugoslavia and Thailand seem really to lack any economically based physical commitment. Slightly better off are Turkey and Israel, which have some economic leverage simply because of the size of their debt to the United States. The nation with the best balanced economic commitment from the United States is probably Spain, with its sizeable debt and investment position and its substantial role as a US market; and it is followed in this well-rounded role by South Korea and Taiwan. That leaves in between those countries with some sort of special purchase on the United States. Here the Saudis and perhaps even the South Africans have to be judged as in a stronger position than Nigeria, because each adds either a strong market or debt investment position to its key commodity leverage. How the Saudis compare with a well-rounded economic relationship like that of Spain or Korea is difficult to judge, especially without the direct investment figures; but given the sensitivity of oil, one suspects that the Saudi physical position is currently the strongest of all on the economic side.

When it comes to the final indicator of physical commitment, US citizens abroad (see Table 3, Indicator 12), Israel and Spain lead the way with fifty to sixty thousand Americans resident in each country. Again, the Saudis also show up surprisingly high on the list at about half that level. However, the Americans in Saudi Arabia are probably only temporarily resident there in connection with economic development activities and therefore easily removed in case of a serious security threat (one thinks of the 40 thousand Americans so recently resident in Iran), whereas the Israeli and Spanish contingents are more likely to be permanently involved in the life of their new countries and hence relatively unmovable. The same kind of permanence probably attaches to the 14 thousand American residents in South Korea and the 7 to 8 thousand currently in South Africa, Taiwan, and Turkey. Of course, when it comes to human lives it is extremely difficult to draw a line on the basis of numbers and say, "these will be protected" but "those are expendable." Still, there must be a clear qualitative as well as quantitative difference between those 60 thousand Americans in Israel and the 3 to 5 thousand now in Nigeria, Thailand, or Yugoslavia. Exactly what that difference would mean if the commitment were tested would depend on the other aspects of America's physical commitment discussed above, on the nature of the crisis, and of course on the speed with which it broke.

Looking back over all the aspects of physical commitment listed on Table 4 (II) makes it clear that Spain, Turkey, and South Korea are in the strongest position, possessing substantial military presences and very considerable economic and personal ties. Israel and Saudi Arabia are perhaps next in line, and one would have to rate the Saudis higher on the physical level because of their stronger military relationship and economic position. On a significantly lower level are Nigeria, South Africa, and Taiwan, each with a physical commitment based primarily on economic grounds. Finally, Thailand and Yugoslavia seem to have little if any hope of an automatic American response due to physical commitment.

**The first indicator on the behavioral level attempts to describe the intensity and the importance of interaction between officials of the United States and the foreign country (see Table 3, Indicator 13).** Without doubt, Israel has had the highest level and greatest intensity of attention from the US Government of any of the countries surveyed here, for the Camp David meetings involved virtually unprecedented interaction between an American President and top officials of another country. The Saudis have also been involved in a very high degree of official interaction with the United States, including visits

by President Carter, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. Equally unprecedented was President Carter's April 1978 trip to Nigeria, returning an earlier visit to Washington by then-President Obasanjo and deliberately emphasizing the importance with which the United States viewed its relationship with Nigeria and that nation's importance on the African continent. South Korea, Turkey, and Yugoslavia occupy a second level of political interaction, with some Presidential involvement but with most contact at the cabinet level. Carter has received both President Tito and Prime Minister Ecevit at the White House, and he eventually decided (after learning of the North Korean military buildup and reversing his troop withdrawal plan) to emphasize the US commitment to South Korea by visiting former President Park in Seoul. At still a lower level have been US contacts with Thailand and Spain, both also involving trips by heads of government to Washington (Kriangsak and Suarez), but backed only by minimal contacts down the line.

It is important to note, of course, that degree of contact is not necessarily an accurate index of the friendliness of intergovernmental relations. United States contact with South Africa has been quite significant, involving Carter, Mondale, and Vance in talks with that nation's prime minister and foreign secretary. However, the contacts revolved around US pressure on South Africa to quit Namibia and moderate *apartheid*, and they even included the expulsion by each nation of the other's defense attaché. Of course, a very low level of contact (as in Taiwan's case) also probably means deteriorating relations or even a deliberate effort to break a commitment, so to get a full appreciation of the situation one must look at the substance of contacts as well as their level and frequency. Nevertheless, the level and intensity of contact regardless of the subject does tend to reinforce the image of a relationship between the two countries, and that in turn may bolster a commitment assumed on other levels. Hence, paradoxically, the same contacts if acrimonious can pull the commitment both ways.

Almost as important to establishing a behavioral commitment as political links are economic ties, represented by the level of trade between two nations (see Table 3, Indicator 14). Not surprisingly, the table shows that by far the highest levels of US trade are with Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, its two primary oil suppliers. But from the US point of view it is trade heavily in deficit, especially with Nigeria, a factor which over time could offset the perceived closeness generated by the trade itself. More balanced and still very substantial



trade relationships are those with South Korea and Taiwan, followed by Spain, South Africa, and Israel (where accounts are close to balance or even show a small surplus for the United States). Unfortunately, it appears that the higher the level of trade, the more likely it is to include a sizeable US deficit. Thailand, Turkey, and Yugoslavia all have virtually insignificant amounts of trade with the United States, but all three countries show American accounts in surplus.

The current level of US aid is of course a very important—if rather volatile—indicator of US commitment (see Table 3, Indicator 15). The figures here are from the Carter administration's FY 1980 budget submission to Congress; Israel again stands in a class by itself, with an aid package nearly six times greater than its nearest competitor in this survey. The contrast with Saudi Arabia could not be more extreme, although the low level of Saudi aid is doubtless a result of their wealth rather than US intent (as may also be the case with Nigeria). After Israel, the next three recipients of US aid—Turkey, South Korea, and Spain—all have formal defense treaties with the United States and bases on their territory, a likely direct stimulus to their high aid levels. Then comes Thailand, with a treaty but (since 1975) a very small US military presence. None of the five remaining countries gets US economic or military aid, either because of wealth (Saudi Arabia and Nigeria), or political alignment (Yugoslavia), or a definite US decision to keep arms length (South Africa and Taiwan), or some combination of the three.

Past levels of US aid lend perspective to these current figures and, if they reinforce them, can indicate a very strong position (see Table 3, Indicator 16). For example, the largest US total aid bills have been to South Korea (\$13 billion) and Israel (\$10 billion), each of which continues to receive substantial amounts of American support. On a second level are Turkey and Taiwan, the first with a continuing aid commitment, but the second showing an obvious break in its history of aid due to an economic self-sufficiency achieved long before the recent treaty termination. Yugoslavia, Thailand, and Spain lie on a third level, followed well back by Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa.

Not surprisingly, these figures compare quite well to the other historical indicator of behavioral commitment: response to an earlier security threat (see Table 3, Indicator 17). In the strongest position here are South Korea and Turkey, where the United States made its most dramatic responses to Soviet expansion in the Far East and in

Europe. But these were responses at some distance in our history, and in neither case did the United States have a prior commitment. More recent, if less spectacular, were American protection of Quemoy-Matsu during the 1950's and of Thailand during the Vietnam war, while still more recent (and still less spectacular) was US military resupply of Israel in 1973 and the assistance given North Yemen in resisting a 1979 Soviet-backed attack that frightened the Saudis. It is indeed striking how few of these actions were taken under formal treaty commitments and how, in general, American responses seem to have become progressively less dramatic over the years.

**In toto, as shown on Table 4 (III), the American behavioral commitment seems strongest to South Korea, Israel, and Turkey, in that order.** Korea has an intense level of political contact, a very strong trade and aid position, and a history of enormous US investment of dollars and blood; Israel has a weaker trade situation and less human sacrifice but more than holds its own in political contact and aid; and Turkey is quite strong across the board except for a very weak trade position. On a second level would be Saudi Arabia, held back because of its trade surplus and lack of need for US aid, and Taiwan, still remarkably strong in spite of its lack of aid and Washington's deliberate restrictions on political contact. Nigeria, in a similar position to Saudi Arabia, cannot be too far behind, and both Thailand and Spain show moderate strength in most of the indicators. Yugoslavia has some behavioral commitment from the United States based on political contact and past aid, but South Africa has almost none at all.

**Since the psychological level is the most difficult of all to assess, it is not surprising that the indicators available here present an even less coherent picture than those on the other levels.** Because there is no reliable estimate available of foreign partisans in the US population, the Census Bureau's figures on the number of first generation immigrants living in the United States have been used to give some indication of the predisposition among certain elements of the citizenry to support defense of a particular country because of cultural ties (see Table 3, Indicator 18). But the data seem highly misleading, since (for example) Yugoslavia ranks second on the list whereas Israel ranks sixth. What is needed is a reliable index of partisanship for all these states of the sort that, for example, a fix on the practicing Jewish population of the United States might provide for Israel. And there is the nearly unanswerable question of larger cultural affinities; for example, of how strongly Arab Americans from any country might support defense of Saudi Arabia, or how many

American blacks would feel strongly about the United States supporting Nigeria in a time of danger. Given such limitations, this indicator must be ranked more by instinctive feel for American politics than close adherence to the numbers. Perhaps the most interesting comparison to be made from this data is that between the number of Taiwanese and South Koreans in the United States—though neither group seems large enough to have a discernable impact on decisionmakers.

Public opinion polls can help to provide a way out of this morass by sampling larger and broader segments of the population. It is particularly difficult, however, to find recent polls that ask the right questions on all the countries surveyed. Even rarer are scientific samples of the opinion of America's leaders in Congress and the executive branch, an extraordinarily useful kind of information for these purposes. The data used for opinion indicators was, therefore, compiled from a variety of sources and represents opinion at various times from 1975 to 1978. Only the figures for indicators 19 and 20 (see Table 3) are directly relatable and quite recent, and they do allow for some very interesting comparisons. For example, of all regions of the world, both American leaders and the public see the highest degree of US vital interest in the Middle East, with a slightly *higher* national interest in Saudi Arabia than in Israel. Also, both the public and leaders see the American interest in South Africa as greater than that in Nigeria, in spite of the latter's role as oil supplier. Less surprising is that the American interest in South Korea is seen by both groups as considerably higher than that in Taiwan. Perhaps the most remarkable case here is Turkey, where the survey revealed an enormous difference in the degree of interest perceived by the leadership and the public. The leaders put Turkey first of the surveyed nations outside the Middle East, but the public put it last. It is the only case where the two groups appear to have widely differing priorities, a fact which if true must be rated a serious weakness in the American commitment to Turkey.

Of course, seeing a vital interest in a country should not be equated with a willingness to defend it. Although the data for indicator 21 is very uneven (see Table 3), it has been included in order to provide the best available look at exactly what the American people would be willing to do in case of attack on these nations. Israel takes the lead here, followed by South Korea, as countries for which a significant number of Americans would be willing to take concrete action. Yugoslavia shows surprising strength, along with Thailand and Taiwan. But these data are even less comparable than those

**surveyed earlier, and the result is only a little better than knowing nothing at all.**

Finally, there is no question but that the large political issues which arise between countries from time to time may have a dramatic impact on the psychological climate and hence on perceptions both of leaders and the public. The reader should be warned that issues are extremely transitory—as an illustration, one need only note that the enormous furor generated over Koreagate in 1977-78 had all but disappeared by 1979. Still, some of the currently headlined issues are listed here (see Table 3, Indicator 22) and marked with a (+) or (-) to indicate whether they served to link the countries further in a partnership effort or were contentious in nature. It may be of interest to note how often the combination of issues seemed to cut in both directions. Only in a few cases, such as South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan, were all the issues contentious, and only in regard to Spain and Yugoslavia was there largely an absence of troublesome concerns. Sometimes the same issue appeared to have contradictory effects: for example, America's racial diplomacy in Africa has been hailed by Nigeria as a vast improvement over that of the Kissinger era but has also often been criticized in black Africa (especially on the Rhodesia issue) for not going far enough. Here, then, the usefulness of the listing is primarily to give some substantive color to the rest of the data on the chart.

Overall, as illustrated on Table 4 (IV), it is clear that Israel, followed closely by Saudi Arabia, ranks highest in psychological commitment. South Korea and Turkey are next, with the Koreans weakened by the disputes over human rights and US troop withdrawal, and the Turks suffering from poor American public understanding of their importance within the NATO alliance and generally low visibility. On the next level, Nigeria and South Africa seem to come out roughly equal, and Taiwan retains a modest level of psychological commitment in spite of the termination of the formal American tie. For Thailand, Spain, and Yugoslavia there is simply not enough evidence to judge, but it looks rather unlikely that decisionmakers or the American people would feel at all committed to defend any of the three. That, of course, does not mean that the United States would not act in the event of an attack; only that the decision to do so would be largely a matter of free choice, not commitment.

### Country Analysis: A Vertical Perspective

Although the kind of analysis just completed may reveal some interesting comparisons, the most important conclusions are those which add up these various indicators and levels of commitment into final judgments on the strength of US ties to the ten countries surveyed. There are, of course, a variety of ways to go about that. Table 3 presents a composite look at the unweighted ranking of each indicator into four categories of significance, visually summing up the preceding analysis. Table 4 simplifies that approach by ranking each *level* of commitment, breaking only the physical level down into the subcategories of military, economic, and human. From that point it should be possible to arrive at some cross-level conclusions about the total American commitment to each of the ten countries and to explain how these final judgments, always subjective, were determined.

*Far East: South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand.* It might be most fruitful to proceed by region, beginning in the Far East. Here one finds the country to which the United States is probably most closely tied outside of Western Europe and Japan: South Korea (see the seventh column of Table 4). That statement could not have been made in 1977 or 1978, for at that time the Carter administration's troop withdrawal plan seemed about to reduce substantially the American commitment. In the event, however, the hornet's nest of opposition stirred up by the plan in Congress and its eventual abandonment by the executive served only to emphasize the strength of the American pledge. As a result all the levels of commitment to Korea are now positive and reinforcing.

**Korea not only has the 1954 defense alliance, it also has a 1977 letter from President Carter that the treaty "remains fully in force" and that US "determination to provide prompt support to help the Republic of Korea defend against armed attack, in accordance with the treaty, remains firm and undiminished."**<sup>12</sup> Although in the winter of 1977-78 the House International Relations Committee balked briefly at approving aid to South Korea in the face of its reluctance to cooperate in the Koreagate bribery investigations, neither that issue nor South Korean human rights violations could prevent the full Congress from approving continued aid to Korea and demanding a final veto on any withdrawal of US troops.<sup>13</sup> The United States is physically committed to Korea by the presence of over 40 thousand soldiers at 21 defense installations on Korean territory and by daily involvement in the Combined Forces Command, to say nothing of the

presence of 14 thousand private American citizens and \$5 1/2 billion in collectible Korean debt. The behavioral level is equally strong, based on intense political contacts at the cabinet level, a nearly in balance annual trade of \$5 1/4 billion, and the extraordinary expense and sacrifice of the Korean War (which cost over 34,000 American lives and—according to one tally—nearly \$200 billion), all reinforced by substantial continuing American aid.<sup>14</sup> Even the psychological level is reasonably firm, with a strong vital interest perception and the highest percentage of the American people for any country surveyed willing (in late 1978) to send troops in case of attack. That psychological stability reflects a major change in public opinion since 1977 which has been reflected in administration policy, resulting in a much less dangerous situation than existed when the physical and legal exposures were not matched by a psychological willingness to respond.

**The commitment to Taiwan, originally quite similar to that given South Korea, has of course been radically diminished by the Carter administration's decision to terminate the treaty of alliance and withdraw all troops as conditions precedent to the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (see the sixth column of Table 4).** In fact the position of Taiwan was rapidly changing even in the 1960's, as the PRC threat diminished (allowing a gradual drawdown of American troops) and the island's economic success permitted the end of US foreign aid. Today, in stark contrast to Korea, there is no physical military commitment at all, no internationally binding legal pledge to defend, and a behavioral level weakened by a virtual lack of official contact and a strongly negative trade situation. Still, such considerations should not be taken to mean that the United States would feel no predisposition to defend Taiwan in case of attack. The image of the United States as Taiwan's protector is hard to break, backed as it is by the defense of Quemoy and Matsu during Cold War crises in the 1950's and an investment of \$6 1/2 billion. To these past behavioral links must be added the psychological impact of the large number of Chinese Americans and their supporters in the United States (who can predict the ultimate strength of the old China lobby in the event of attack?) and the consistent readings of public opinion samples that Americans do not approve of the so-called "abandonment" of Taiwan.<sup>15</sup> In addition, though it is gone on the military side, a physical commitment based on economic ties remains, including \$400 million in direct US investment and \$3 1/2 billion in Taiwanese debt to the United States.

It is, to say the least, a rather mixed situation and especially so on the formal level, which should (given the treaty's abrogation) be the clearest. Ambiguity was probably not the President's intent when, following months of careful diplomatic inactivity, he announced on 15 December 1978 that the United States and the People's Republic of China would exchange ambassadors on 1 March 1979, and that Peking's *sine qua non* for normalization—abrogation of the US-Taiwanese defense treaty—would be satisfied following the required 1-year notification period. Apparently the United States decided to move to full relations with the mainland government, not because of any specific concessions or promises made by the Chinese, but on the general grounds that the new pragmatic leadership of Deng Xiaoping seemed firmly in control of China, was definitely interested in improved relations with the United States, and lacked either the desire or the means to take the island by military force. Hence the President offered only minimal public assurances to Taiwan, simply noting that the United States would "continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue." Vance, Brzezinski, and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke were careful to add only that the United States would "remain an Asian and Pacific power" with major military forces in the region and would continue to act as required to protect its interests. When pressed, Vance would go no further than to call peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue "of critical importance."<sup>16</sup>

Unfortunately, however, the shift from official to unofficial relations with Taiwan required legislative action, and the administration was forced to approach Congress just as the United States was suffering a variety of setbacks and even humiliations in Iran, Indochina, and Afghanistan. Conservative members of Congress were outraged at the treaty termination and sought (under the leadership of Senator Barry Goldwater) to block it as unconstitutional by congressional or court action. Others on the right attempted to keep relations with Taiwan on an official level by replacing the US Embassy in Taiwan with a liaison office. But far more serious were the objections of moderate and liberal Republicans, like Senators Charles Percy and Jacob Javits, who reflected the majority view of the public in approving relations with the PRC but refusing to sacrifice Taiwan. Senator Javits wanted to add language to the administration's legislation identical to that in the expiring treaty, and Senator Percy brought the Senate to within three votes of stating that nonpeaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue would be "a threat to the security interests of the United States;" President Carter had to threaten to veto the whole package to stop that wording. However, at the end of March he

reluctantly accepted a bill approved by both houses (85-4 and 339-50) that declares it US policy "to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States." The legislation also declared it American policy to provide defensive arms to the island and stated that the United States would "maintain the capacity . . . to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan."<sup>17</sup> Equally important, President Carter felt compelled by all this opposition to remark that the United States would remain free to interpose its Pacific Fleet between Taiwan and the mainland or even to "go to war. . . to protect the people of Taiwan." And National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski has made it clear that the United States intends to maintain not only economic and cultural contact with Taiwan but military contact as well, including equipment sales, training of some military personnel, visits of American naval vessels and even joint military exercises.<sup>18</sup>

What, then, is one to conclude about the US commitment to Taiwan? Though hardly intended, one result of the administration's move to terminate the treaty was to provoke a strong statement of congressional determination to defend Taiwan from forceable takeover by the PRC, as well as actual admission by the executive that it too would probably have to react. In this sense the Taiwanese case, like the Korean withdrawal plan, was a fine example of how an effort to decommit can have a short-term boomerang effect. At the same time, the fact remains that the physical military commitment is gone and so is (or will be) the binding legal pledge. Congresses and executives change, and their statements of intent—as well as the psychological determination provoked by the President's dramatic announcement—are bound to fade quickly unless kept current by continued public pledges. Whatever its present strength, therefore, the US long-run commitment to defend Taiwan must rest in the future on economic relations, operating to tie the nations behaviorally and to increase the American stake in the island's future prosperity. American freedom of action on Taiwan may not ever be totally restored, but it should increase dramatically in the months and years ahead.

**Thailand, the last nation surveyed in Asia, has also been subject to rather dramatic changes in its defense relationship to the United States, but here recent trends indicate an increasing US commitment (see the fifth column of Table 4). To a certain extent these changes represent a return to a more normal situation after the period of**



strained relations following the fall of Saigon, when the Thais felt it necessary to demand the withdrawal of all American troops and bases from their territory. But it also reflects a change in the Carter administration's thinking about the uses of American power, and its decision that a response was needed to the Soviet alliance with Vietnam and that nation's virtual conquest of Cambodia. As a consequence, the President took actions in early 1979 that increased the legal and behavioral levels of American commitment.

The United States had been formally pledged to defend Thailand since ratifying the 1954 South East Asia Collective Defense Treaty, and it was also bound to intervene in any armed attack on Thailand by a congressionally approved communique signed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and former Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman in 1962. But the age of the two pledges made them suspect, as did Washington's willingness to allow the demise of SEATO in 1977 with only a cryptic statement by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State that, while the United States "does stand by its old commitments," the Carter administration "would make its own judgment [in a crisis] depending on the specific circumstances."<sup>19</sup> This ambiguous stance clarified dramatically in February 1979, when President Carter welcomed Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanand to the White House with the public statement that the United States was "intensely interested and deeply committed to the integrity and to the freedom and the security of Thailand—that your borders stay inviolate."<sup>20</sup> To back up the statement, the President asked Congress to increase military aid to Thailand and to release for Thai use over \$11 million in US ammunition stored in that country.<sup>21</sup> As a result the Thais possess a far stronger legal commitment from the United States than they enjoyed even a year before, a pledge which must now be judged virtually as strong as that to Japan or Korea.

By these assurances to Thailand the President may also have put the United States in a dangerous position, since none of the other levels of commitment appear to match the legal one. Only the behavioral level shows any strength at all, and (in spite of a few American military personnel in the country) there is almost no physical presence to require an automatic protective American response. Although there is very little data on the psychological level, these facts make it highly unlikely that the American people would see a need to defend Thailand should an attack occur, especially considering the country's remote geographical location. Indeed, no other country on our survey has a bigger gap between legal pledge and

reality. It is a state of affairs which makes the President's assurances look very like a bluff and presages a most uncomfortable situation for him should that bluff be called.

*Western Europe: Turkey, Spain, Yugoslavia.* The countries surveyed in Western Europe present a far less ambiguous and on the whole better managed array of American commitment, with the United States clearly committed to two of them (Turkey and Spain) and definitely uncommitted to the third (Yugoslavia). Turkey (see the ninth column of Table 4) is covered by the NATO guarantee and on that ground may seem not to warrant further consideration, since the politico-military consequences of an American failure to honor that pledge would be so severe as to make inaction unthinkable. And yet, as we have seen, the NATO language leaves the character of the US response undefined, while the Turks have historically pursued the ambiguous course encouraged by their political geography. From time to time, Americans and Turks have had differences over such matters as Cyprus and the military use of their territory, and today the Turkish future is heavily obscured by economic distress and political violence. Given these circumstances, even a NATO commitment seems worth examining.

**Unquestionably the most divisive issue in US-Turkish relations has been the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, accomplished with American-made weapons in violation of clear legal stipulations limiting their use to defensive purposes.** The Congress responded by imposing an embargo on military aid to Turkey in early 1975, to be removed only when the Cyprus issue was settled. In 1976 Henry Kissinger negotiated a 4-year, \$1 billion defense agreement with Turkey. Predictably, he was unable to get Congress to approve it, in spite of his warning that linking the agreement to the Cyprus problem would have "disastrous" consequences "for decades" to come. The Carter administration began with a not-so-subtle acceptance of that linkage by submitting the basic agreement but declining to ask Congress for approval until the Turks moved towards a Cyprus settlement. Accordingly, the Turks dug in their heels on Cyprus, closed some American installations, threatened to expell all US troops, and opened talks on an eventual friendship treaty with Moscow. After about a year of this stalemate, the administration moved back to an "unlinked" approach, jettisoning the 1976 bases/aid agreement but asking the Congress for immediate repeal of the arms embargo on the grounds that it was not producing results on Cyprus and might cost the United States its vital intelligence installations in Turkey or even permanently alienate that country from NATO. In June 1978 the

administration elevated repeal of the embargo to its first foreign policy priority, finally winning in Congress at the end of September. The Turks promptly re-opened the four intelligence facilities they had closed, and the Carter administration moved to increase its yearly requests to the Congress for aid for Turkey and to begin talks on a new bases agreement. But American relations with Turkey have remained extremely tense, with the economically strapped Turks demanding billions in aid as well as elaborate military concessions which the sagging Western economies may have difficulty in granting. The Turks have even had the temerity to ask Moscow for approval of American requests to fly the U-2 on SALT verification missions from Turkish soil!<sup>22</sup>

What does this stormy political history mean to the strength of the US commitment? Not, in the end, very much. The NATO pledge is hardly affected, since the confidence factors discussed earlier make it perform as strong for Turkey as it is for West Germany or Britain. And the Carter administration decision to end the arms embargo at all cost is testament to its view of the importance of Turkey to the Atlantic alliance. Although the congressional votes on repeal of the embargo were extremely close (57-42 and 208-205), these votes probably reflected support for Greece rather than any disposition to let Turkey drown in a sea of Soviet troops.<sup>23</sup> In a manner quite unlike the Thai case, this legal pledge is backed fully by the physical presence of American forces, as well as by (on the behavioral level) a pattern of substantial American aid going back to the Truman Doctrine plus a great deal of high-level diplomatic contact. There is, to be sure, a rather small US economic stake in Turkey (though this may change as a result of current fiscal rescue efforts) and the bothersome divergence noted above between public and leadership perceptions of Turkey's importance. But the troops are more than enough physical presence to make up for economic weakness, and public attitudes may well be changing as the SALT II debates make the need for Turkish-based intelligence clear. Indeed, the Turks own realization of how important they are in American eyes is probably more to blame for political friction than any US failure to appreciate Turkey's value. The Turks are proving tough negotiators because they do not appear to doubt the American defense commitment, even in bad political and economic times. This analysis suggests that their confidence is well placed.

**Spain, at the other end of NATO's southern flank but without its guarantee, must nevertheless be judged nearly as well protected by the United States as Turkey (see the eighth column of Table 4). This is**

a case in which the legal level, long delayed by Western distaste for the Franco regime, has not quite caught up with the physical commitment. Indeed, no other country surveyed has the degree of physical commitment Spain has. On the military side are nearly nine thousand American troops at four large bases, backed by a Combined Military Coordination and Planning Staff whose job is to integrate Spanish forces into NATO military contingency planning.<sup>24</sup> The American economic stake in Spain includes the highest levels of direct investment and private debt of any of the countries surveyed, and there are 50 thousand Americans resident in Spain. The behavioral level is slightly less impressive, although trade is in substantial surplus for the United States and the admittedly moderate level of political contact has been most cordial. In fact, though psychological data is not available and few expressions of US defense support can be expected for a country as geographically secure as Spain, recent Spanish-American relations have been marked by fulsome US praise for Spain's budding democracy and a virtual absence of serious contentious issues.

It may seem curious, then, that the US legal commitment in the 1976 treaty was given in so ambiguous a manner. The 1976 treaty, for all its discussion of a "defense relationship" and its establishment of elaborate coordinating bodies to bring about this relationship, nowhere offers the NATO-like pledge that such military integration logically requires. And the US Senate, in a masterpiece of rhetorical contradiction, managed in its consent to ratification to deny that the treaty had increased the US commitment while simultaneously hoping that full Spanish cooperation with NATO would do so.<sup>25</sup> The reason for such studied ambiguity is to be found in the post-Vietnam atmosphere of 1976 as well as in American respect for the fragility of democracy in Spain, where NATO membership is a contentious issue. President Carter has said that "full participation by Spain in the community of the Western democracies would strengthen the security of all," a careful formulation which can be interpreted to mean that the United States will welcome the Spanish into NATO when they and it are ready.<sup>26</sup> And on a 1979 visit to Madrid the chairman of the House International Relations Committee underlined congressional interest in Spain's joining NATO, saying it "belongs to the Western family and should play its part in the defense of Europe."<sup>27</sup> Meantime, the commitment is assured by other than legal means.

**Although it would be incorrect to speak of an American defense commitment to Yugoslavia—a Communist state which founded and leads the non-aligned movement—the Carter administration has**

made a major effort to tighten the US-Yugoslavia relationship (see the tenth column of Table 4). There is really no physical American tie to Yugoslavia either of a military, economic or human nature, and the lack of data makes a psychological assessment difficult (although one should note the substantial number of Yugoslavians in the United States and the surprising percentage of Americans who would send troops to defend the country). What the Carter administration has done is to carefully broaden the behavioral and formal levels through expanded high-level political contact, increased military cooperation, and stronger statements of support. In 1977, Vice President Mondale and Tito's heir apparent Edward Kardelj visited each others' capitals; these visits were followed by a similar exchange between Defense Secretary Brown and his Yugoslavian counterpart, General Nikola Ljubicic. The trips provided the occasion for much talk about expansion of military ties—e.g., weapons sales, training, ship and officer visits—in order to help the Yugoslavs (as one US official put it) "maintain their leverage and independence."<sup>28</sup> Finally, in March 1978 President Tito visited President Carter in Washington and agreed to a joint statement expressing the "continuing support of the United States for the independence, territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia."<sup>29</sup>

The words of the joint statement came closer than ever before to an American security promise, particularly when viewed against the background of growing military cooperation. But there is no hint (à la Thailand) that the United States would back its "support" with specific action, and the politico-military cooperation is as yet far more symbolic than real. Certainly US involvement shades closer to commitment than it did 2 years ago, and it is not impossible that a future American President would decide (as Sir John Hackett would have it) to answer a Yugoslav request for help against a Soviet invasion.<sup>30</sup> If he did so today, however, it would certainly be more an exercise of American freedom of action than fulfillment of a commitment to the defense of Yugoslavia.

*Africa: Nigeria, South Africa.* Nigeria and South Africa, the two nations surveyed in the dark continent, are in situations somewhat the reverse of Yugoslavia's (see the third and fourth columns of Table 4). Neither has any formal defense pledge from the United States or significant military cooperation with it; such recent high-level contact as has occurred has revolved around quite different economic and political issues. These nations' commitments from the United States,

if indeed they have any, rest entirely on indirect grounds: principally, on economic relationships which may add up to physical or behavioral ties. In fact, it is alleged from time to time (often by Marxist observers) that the United States will follow its economic interests in dealing with the issue of white supremacy in southern Africa, the key problem on which Nigeria and South Africa remain at loggerheads. The trouble with that view is not only that it ignores non-economic influences on American foreign policy but also that it fails to reveal which set of US economic interests—those with South Africa or with Nigeria—are controlling. And those are precisely the problems that must be addressed in assessing the relative strength of US commitment to the two countries.

**The American economic stake in Nigeria and South Africa is so evenly matched that it is difficult to predict with accuracy which has the strongest US physical commitment.** Neither is very important as a market for American goods, although Nigeria's relatively lower level of development and large trade surplus with the United States indicate at least great potential. Each sells one or more key commodities to the United States: Nigeria is the United States second ranking supplier of oil, and South African chrome is important enough that President Carter ignored congressional pressure in 1978 to raise tariffs on its importation.<sup>31</sup> Given the energy situation, and considering that the United States has sizeable stockpiles of chrome, it is likely that oil would be the more effective lever—as Nigeria has apparently noticed.<sup>32</sup> Offsetting that factor, however, is the enormous imbalance in direct investment and private bank debt, where the combined US stake in South Africa is five times that in Nigeria. Whether American decisionmakers would see that as more significant than Nigerian oil is an extremely tricky question, the answer to which depends a great deal on the ties of the administration in power to business and banking interests. For our purposes it might be best simply to declare a standoff at a rather significant level of physical economic commitment for both nations.

**Where the Nigerians do come out well ahead, though, is on the behavioral level. Nigerian trade is three times that of South Africa (because of oil, of course), though heavily in deficit for the United States. More important is the political level, where American contacts with the two countries could hardly be more different in character. With Nigeria there has been an exchange of Presidential visits designed to show Lagos that the Carter administration views Nigeria as the most important black country in Africa and a pivotal actor in efforts to find a peaceful solution to problems of racial oppression in**

the south. With South Africa, on the other hand, there have been only lectures, delivered by Vice President Mondale to then Prime Minister Vorster in Vienna and later by the President to Foreign Minister Botha in a secret White House meeting, about how South Africa must either cooperate in Namibia, in Rhodesia, and on apartheid or face American opposition from the UN Security Council to the US Commerce Department. There is no question but that the administration has treated Nigeria as an ally while subjecting South Africa to constant pressure which could hardly give the impression of a close relationship between the two countries.

In the final analysis, then, it seems likely that the United States would come to Nigeria's defense before it would move to protect South Africa. Indeed, American relations with South Africa have deteriorated to such an extent that, considering probable racial divisions on the issue in this country, it seems highly unlikely that the United States would defend South Africa under any circumstances short of an outright Soviet invasion. The quality of US-South African relations has even had a negative impact on the formal level, with various bodies of Congress pushing the administration to be even tougher with the Afrikaners and add commercial discrimination to diplomatic pressure.<sup>33</sup> It is true that on the psychological level Nigeria falls slightly behind South Africa in leadership priorities and considerably behind in the public's sense of vital interests, but it seems unlikely that the difference is significant or that it would persist in the face of broader dissemination of the other facts on the chart. To put it cautiously, then, one can say that the United States would be less likely to defend South Africa than Nigeria, though circumstances under which it would do more than sell equipment to either state are rather hard to imagine.

*Middle East: Israel, Saudi Arabia.* Israel and Saudi Arabia, the countries selected for examination in the Middle East, present another interesting comparative study but at the opposite end of the scale of American commitment (see the first and second columns of Table 4). Here, in fact, it is quite likely that the United States would defend either nation against attack and do so if necessary with the full weight of its conventional military power. And yet, as in the African cases, the United States faces a situation here where the two states are not only historically at odds but have recently been driven into active opposition over the Israeli-Egyptian treaty. Hence the need is again for a comparative assessment, to determine which country the United States would protect in case of a clash between them or their

allies or, as seems more likely, whether the commitment to one would tend to preclude action under (and hence effectively cancel out) the commitment to the other. Can the United States, in other words, have strong and credible commitments simultaneously to two diametrically opposed states?

**On the legal/formal level, the Israelis seem to hold the edge over the Saudis.** Both states have the UN language about collective self-defense written into treaties with the United States, but, in addition, Israel has the specific guarantees spelled out in the Memorandum of Agreement underwriting the treaty with Egypt. It provides, in case of a violation of the treaty which the United States agrees has threatened Israel's security (specifically including an armed attack), that the United States "will take such remedial measures as it deems appropriate," including "military" action, and will consider, "on an urgent basis, such measures as the strengthening of the United States presence in the area, the providing of emergency supplies to Israel, and the exercise of maritime rights in order to put an end to the violation."<sup>34</sup> Although applicable only to a very narrow range of causes (i.e., violations of the treaty by Egypt), this language comes very close to that of NATO's article 5 and must be considered along with such items as the American pledge to keep Israel supplied with oil and the administration's decision to treat Israel exactly like an alliance partner in terms of priority for arms supply. In the area of executive statements, the Saudis have received repeated and recent assurances that the United States considers "the territorial integrity and security of Saudi Arabia a matter of fundamental interest" (Vance), that the United States can and will "provide the extra strength needed to meet a foe from outside the region" and is willing and able to be a good friend "in peace or war" (Brown), and that the administration is "prepared to go to war, if necessary, to protect Saudi Arabia" (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William R. Crawford).<sup>35</sup> Executive promises to the Israelis, however, are at least as copious and more longstanding, and they recur at the highest levels whenever Israel gets nervous about shifts in American policy (which is to say, about every other month). Presidential pledges to Israel also have an element of priority, as in this early Carter statement:

We have a special relationship with Israel. It's absolutely crucial that no one in our country or around the world ever doubt that our No. 1 commitment in the Middle East is to protect the right of Israel to exist, to exist permanently, and to exist in peace.<sup>36</sup>



Even the US oil plight, according to Secretary Vance, has no impact on American policy: American support "for the security and well being of Israel is firm and unshakable."<sup>37</sup> Similarly, although the Congress did finally approve the administration's package plane sale to Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt, the votes were close and there was particular objection to including the Saudis (Carter received letters of opposition from 12 of 16 members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and 21 out of 37 members of its House counterpart).<sup>38</sup> Needless to add, the Congress has shown its support for Israel in ways both numerous and expensive.

**On the physical level, however, it looks as though American ties to Saudi Arabia may eclipse those to Israel.** The United States has many times more military personnel in Saudi Arabia than in Israel, and in FY 1979 the United States sold the Saudis five times as much military equipment and expertise as it sold the Israelis.<sup>39</sup> American military cooperation with both countries is extremely close, but there is no Israeli institutional counterpart to the US-Saudi Joint Military Commission. It is true that the handful of American civilians who staffed the Sinai Field Mission as part of the second pullback agreement of 1975 could be seen (and are seen by Moshe Dayan)<sup>40</sup> as performing a tripwire function, but their significance has decreased with the increasing improbability that an attack on Israel would come from Egypt. The American economic stake in Saudi Arabia is even more impressive relative to that in Israel, for Israel has nothing (unlike South Africa) with which to offset the Saudi role as the US primary oil supplier; moreover, Israel is also a much smaller market for American goods and services than Saudi Arabia. Though the data is not available one suspects that American direct investment in Saudi Arabia is greater than that in Israel, while the two countries' indebtedness to the American banking system is almost equal. The only indicator in which the Israelis exceed the Saudis is in debt to the US Government, and here the Israelis are simply in a class by themselves. Given this economic and military data, it is fair to say that only in human terms does the US physical commitment to the Israelis outperform that to the Saudis, who otherwise have assured themselves of a more likely automatic American response.

**On the behavioral level the balance of forces probably switches back to the Israelis, although the indicators are very mixed.** Historically, of course, the Israelis have a commanding position, for they have been seen worldwide as a US ally since the day when President Harry S Truman recognized them within hours of their formal independence. That special relationship, as President Carter

called it, has included massive foreign aid (which continues to flow at a rate of \$5 million per day) and clear response to past cause (as for example US resupply of Israel's military machine during the October War of 1973). But if the Saudis cannot match this history of contact with the United States, they are at least matching Israel in the current indicators. They too have a recent US response to cause in the early 1979 clash between North and South Yemen when, in a very murky situation, Washington came to the aid of the North solely to appease Saudi sensibilities. Although the Israelis have probably had more presidential contact due to the Camp David process, President Carter did go to Riyadh as have Secretary Brown and Dr. Brzezinski—the difference in top-level attention has not been substantial. And the trade figures of course put the Saudis way out in front, though also deeply in deficit from the American point of view. On the psychological level the limited data suggest an almost equal situation, but it seems obvious that the powerful Jewish lobby in the United States would provide a sparkplug for intervention that the Saudis simply do not enjoy. Whether the increasing public recognition of Saudi importance revealed by the data would provide a broader, if weaker, base of support for intervention in a crisis is difficult to determine, but it would probably depend on the nature of the crisis (e.g., appearance of Soviet involvement) and the state of the US perceived energy future at the time.

The Israelis lead, then, in legal and perhaps behavioral commitment, while the Saudis are clearly ahead on the powerful physical level, and the psychological seems close to equal. What does it all add up to? Perhaps nothing more remarkable (though it *is* remarkable) than that Saudi Arabia is about as likely to be defended against external attack by the United States as is Israel. Any attempt to be more specific would require some examination of threat scenarios, a matter well beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say for now that the Saudi commitment would make it rather difficult for the United States to visibly oppose a united Arab attack on Israel, which is (after the Baghdad summit) Israel's most likely external threat. It would be easier for the United States to help the Saudis with what might be judged their most likely threat, a Soviet-backed incursion by Arab neighbors. It therefore appears more likely that the commitment to Saudi Arabia would block performance under the Israeli commitment than the other way around. At the same time, as the Iranian case so clearly proved, it would be extremely difficult for the United States to be at all helpful in case of internal disruption in either country, and that kind of trouble seems far more likely in Saudi Arabia than in the stable and democratic (if economically troubled)

**Israel. As the Saudis are well aware, internal instability is a possibility which the evidence of an American commitment may help or hinder, depending on how skillfully relations are handled.**

#### **IV. ENDNOTES**

1. Sources for Table 2 are as follows (by numbered indicator):

(1) US Department of State, Office of Legal Advisor, Treaty Affairs Staff, "Treaties in Force, a List of Treaties and other International Agreements of the United States in Force on 1 January 1978." Number of treaties and agreements listed for each country under subhead "Defense" is first noted, then the title or kind of agreement *closest* to a security commitment.

(2) & (3) Information here was compiled over the several months since 1977 from various articles in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*. Some were located through survey of the *New York Times Index* for each country, January 1977-April 1979.

(4) Department of Defense, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), "Fact sheet-US Military Strengths—Worldwide as of 30 September 1978" (News Release #617-78, 30 November 1978).

(5) Data on military bases and acreage is compiled from US Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics), *Base Structure Annex to Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1980* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 1979), *passim*.

(6) Data from author's general knowledge, telephone inquiries to the Departments of State and Defense, and other sources used for other indicators on the Table.

(7) International Monetary Fund, *Direction of International Trade*, accessed through CIA computerized data bank.

(8) Data from author's general knowledge and various Department of Interior publications, especially Bureau of Mines, *Mineral Facts and Problems* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975).

(9) Data is for US direct investment abroad in all industries for yearend 1977. Source: International Investment Division, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Washington, DC. Data ties with that in Table 13, *Survey of Current Business* (Washington: US Department of Commerce, August 1978).

(10) Total claims of 124 reporting US banks on foreign public and private borrowers by country of residence, less claims guaranteed by agents in a third country (Table II, Column 4, *Federal Reserve Country Exposure Lending Survey*, 7 December 1978). Includes cross-currency and cross-border lending by US domestic banks and their foreign branches, affiliates, and majority owned subsidiaries. Excludes claims on foreigners by other US-located agencies and branches of foreign banks in the United States, overseas bank-held but customer-owned claims on foreigners, and local currency transactions of US foreign branches in-country. Current statistics do not permit the netting out of inter-bank lending, but the totals are of little significance relative to the total level of transactions listed here. I am most grateful to Gregory P. Wilson of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, US House of Representatives, for guidance through this data. See also Genie Dudding Short and Betsy Buttrill White, "International Bank Lending: A Guided Tour through the Data", *FRBNY Quarterly Review* (Autumn 1978): 39-46.

(11) Consolidated Utilized and Still Outstanding Credits of the US Government to Official Foreign Government Obligors and Private Foreign Obligors (sum of figures given in 1st columns of Tables 1 and 2), Office of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy, *Status of Active Foreign Credits of the United States Government, 30 September 1978* (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy, US Treasury Department, 1979).

(12) Department of State, Bureau of Personnel, Office of Management, Operating Systems Division, "US Citizens Residing in Foreign Countries as of 30 June 1978." Total includes US Government employees, their dependents, and all other American residents excluding only active duty US military (for which see indicator 4).

(13) Data on visits of top Carter administration officials culled from *New York Times Index*, 1977, 1978, and January-April 1979. Each entry includes a term indicating the level at which contacts generally took place (presidential, ministerial, subcabinet) and the degree of contact across all levels (intense, substantial, moderate, infrequent). Generally the terms are self-explanatory, but "Presidential" has been reserved for situations of exchange visits (where each President has visited the other in his capital). As it happens, all countries labeled "ministerial" have had one-way Presidential contact.

(14) US Department of Commerce, Overseas Business Reports, "United States Foreign Trade Annual, 1971-1977," June 1978. Total of 1977 figures for each country from table 11 (Exports) and table 12 (Imports).

(15) Data is roughly comparable to that in indicator 16. Development assistance data is from tables on "Summary of Programs by Country and Appropriation," found at the beginning of the regional volumes of Agency for International Development, *Congressional Presentation FY 1980* (Washington: Government Printing Office, February 1979). Data on PL 480 Food For Peace comes from the main volume of that set, pp. 127-132. Military aid data from US Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Congressional Presentation: Security Assistance Program, FY 1980* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 8-10. Peace Corps data from *ACTION, FY 1980 Budget Estimate, International Programs* (Peace Corps), Submission to the Congress (January 1979), appendix G: Individual Country Summary.

(16) Total Loans and Grants for Economic and Military Assistance, 1946-1977 (line III, column 10, "Country Detail by Region"), *US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, Obligations*

and Loan Authorizations, 1 July 1945- 30 September 1977 (Washington, DC: Office of Program and Information Analysis Services, Bureau for Program Policy and Coordination, Agency for International Development, 1978). Excludes Ex-Im Bank and OPIC financing.

(17) Drawn from author's general knowledge and various other sources used compiling this Table.

(18) Total number of US foreign-born citizens in country, from US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population*, vol. 1, pt. 1, sec. 2, table 192, "Country of Origin of the Foreign Stock by Nativity and Race, 1970."

(19) & (20) Data taken from John E. Reilly, ed., *American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1979* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1979), "Table III-3, Perceptions of US Vital Interests-1978," p. 16.

(21) Data compiled from Reilly, *American Public Opinion*, "Table V-3. US Response to Crisis Situations-1978," p. 26; and George H. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1972-1977* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1978), vol. I, pp. 468-490. The latter poll was taken 18-21 April 1975, immediately after the fall of Saigon, and asked what the United States should do if a nation was attacked by Communist backed forces: send troops, send supplies, or refuse to get involved. The data for Thailand, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey comes exclusively from that poll. The Reilly poll of late 1978 offered other options (like "refuse to trade" or "try to negotiate") to deal with attacks by various parties on Israel, South Korea, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia. Generally, the willingness to send troops was much higher here than in 1975, but readiness to send supplies was much lower (possibly because of the availability here of other options). For Korea and Yugoslavia, this data was used exclusively; for Israel and Taiwan, averages were taken with 1975 data. Comparability of data in this category between countries is therefore very marginal.

(22) Drawn from author's general knowledge and various other sources used compiling this Table.

2. Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between Spain and the United States of America, Articles V and VI, and Supplementary Agreement on Bilateral Military Coordination (Number 5), Article II. 27 UST 3012 and 3031.
3. United States-Israel Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1952 (3 UST 4985); United States-Saudi Military Training Mission Agreement of 1977 (28 UST 2409).
4. See p. 50.
5. On Korea, *Washington Post*, 26 July 1977; on Thailand, *Washington Post*, 9 February 1979; on Taiwan, *Washington Post*, 11 February 1979; on Yugoslavia, *New York Times*, 10 March 1978.
6. *New York Times*, 30 April 1977.
7. See my survey, "Les engagements mondiaux des États-Unis après le Vietnam," *Politique Internationale* 4 (Summer 1979): 23-43.
8. 27 UST 3008.
9. *Washington Post*, 22 June 1979; *Washington Star*, 26 March 1979.
10. US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, *Monthly Energy Review*, August 1979 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979): data from Tables on Petroleum Imports from OPEC and Non-OPEC Sources, pp. 34-35.
11. US Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, *Mineral Commodity Summaries 1978* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978).

12. *Washington Post*, 26 July 1977. During his 30 June 1979 visit to Seoul, Carter reiterated that the US "military commitment to Korea's security is unshakable, strong, and enduring." *Washington Post*, 1 July 1979.
13. *New York Times*, 28 October 1977; 22 May 1978; 12 September 1978.
14. The cost estimate is from James Stentzel, "Our Deadly Game in Korea," *The Nation* 222 (24 April 1976): 493.
15. *New York Times*, 14 January 1979; 29 January 1979.
16. Carter's announcement and assurance, *Washington Post*, 16 December 1978; Holbrooke, Vance, Brzezinski statements from *Washington Post*, 19 December 1978, and 16 January 1979.
17. Congressional action in *Washington Post*, 22 February 1979, and *New York Times*, 9, 29, and 30 March 1979; Taiwan Relations Act, 10 April 1979, 22 USC 3301.
18. Carter news conference, *Washington Post*, 11 February 1979; Brzezinski guidelines, *Washington Post*, 10 April 1979.
19. *Washington Post*, 29 June 1977.
20. *Washington Post*, 7 February 1979. Kriangsak later maintained that Carter had privately promised that the United States would take "definite action" if Thailand's security were threatened, and a specific warning to that effect was delivered to Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Kriangsak news conference in *New York Times*, 8 February 1979; Soviet warning revealed at Carter news conference, *New York Times*, 18 January 1979.
21. *Washington Post*, 21 January 1979. Congress has given little evidence to date of how it feels.
22. This brief history of US-Turkish relations since 1975 was compiled from the *Washington Post*, 4 October 1978, 9 May 1979, 25 May 1979, and the *New York Times*, 20 April 1977, 2 April 1978, and 19 March 1979.
23. Vote counts from *New York Times*, 26 July and 2 August 1978.



24. Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Supplementary Agreement on the US-Spanish Council, Article V; Supplementary Agreement on Bilateral Military Coordination, Article II; 27 USC 3016, 3031.

25. To quote article (2), "the United States, while recognizing that this Treaty does not expand the existing United States defense commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty area or create a mutual defense commitment between the United States and Spain, looks forward to the development of such an expanded relationship between Western Europe and a democratic Spain as would be conducive to Spain's full cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its activities and mutual defense obligations." 27 UST 3008.

26. Carter quoted by Jody Powell in *New York Times*, 30 April 1977.

27. Representative Clement Zablocki quoted in *Washington Post*, 23 August 1979.

28. Quoted on background in *New York Times*, 14 October 1977.

29. *New York Times*, 10 March 1978.

30. See General Sir John Hackett et al., *The Third World War: August 1985* (New York: Macmillan, 1978).

31. *New York Times*, 29 January 1978.

32. The Nigerians threatened to use the oil weapon against the United States in May 1979 over recognition of Muzorewa's government in Zimbabwe—Rhodesia and actually used it against Britain by nationalizing BP's interest in Nigerian oil just before the August Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka.

33. In January 1978 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee urged Carter to discourage US investment in South Africa, and the Congress enacted legislation in late 1978 to cut off Ex-Im Bank loans. *New York Times*, 26 January and 13 November 1978.

34. "Memorandum of Agreement between the US and Israel," paragraphs 2 and 3, reprinted by the *New York Times*, 29 March 1979.

35. Vance interview on CBS "Face The Nation," 18 March 1979, quoted in *Washington Post*, 19 March 1979; Brown to Saudis in Riyadh on 10 February 1979, quoted in *Washington Post*, 11 February 1979; Crawford testimony to the House Subcommittee on the Middle East on 12 March 1979, quoted in *Washington Post*, 15 March 1979.
36. News conference of 12 May 1977, transcript printed in the *New York Times*, 13 May 1977.
37. Vance quoted in *New York Times*, 9 August 1979.
38. *New York Times*, 11 March 1978.
39. Equipment sales data from *Washington Post*, 11 October 1979.
40. *Washington Post*, 27 September 1979.

(least for the U.S.)  
→ the author lists 10 countries

## V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCLAIMERS: THE LIMITS OF THEORY

If the reader has found these country analyses at all cogent, he may be interested in the final array presented in Table 5. Here all 10 countries are listed in rank order of the strength of American commitment to them, with the United States arbitrarily defined as "committed" to those above the line and "uncommitted" to those below. It is important to point out that the differences in commitment between countries do not appear to be at all equal; in fact, the countries surveyed seem to group themselves roughly into four categories or overall levels of commitment. In the first category are nations to which the United States would, in the conclusion of this analysis, almost certainly respond with its full conventional military power, including troops, in case of a serious armed attack. This category includes such old allies as South Korea, Turkey, and Israel, and two relative newcomers, Spain and Saudi Arabia. Category II <sup>contains</sup> includes two countries—Taiwan and Thailand—to which the United States would very probably respond if an attack occurred, but not as surely as with category I countries and probably to a smaller extent: e.g., supplies but no troops. Category III countries are those with which the United States is definitely not committed to a total response but might well feel compelled to help defend to some extent, depending on the circumstances of the threat: Nigeria and Yugoslavia, <sup>U.S.</sup> must be placed here. Finally, South Africa falls in a fourth category in being very unlikely at present to receive any response at all except in the most exceptional circumstances. ~~U.S.~~

**TABLE 5. America Commitment to Ten Selected Countries:  
Ranking by Strength**

South Korea		
Turkey		
Saudi Arabia	I	certain, full response
Israel		
Spain		
<hr/>		
Taiwan		
Thailand	II	very likely, substantial response
<hr/>		
Nigeria		
Yugoslavia	III	possible, partial response
<hr/>		
South Africa	IV	unlikely, any response

Appropriate or not, it seems wise and indeed necessary to close this kind of macro-analysis with an equally broad disclaimer. The elaborate data and the country discussions based on it are only intended as interesting and perhaps provocative illustrations of the general theory of commitment assessment. Although every effort has been made to gather accurate and complete data, the information at hand is only partial and not at all-uniform; much of it will doubtless also be well out of date by the time this is read. The various indicators displayed may not even be the best available for purposes of the theory. And even if the data were perfect, judgments made in light of it might still be very faulty. The intent is not so much to draw final conclusions about specific present-day American commitments, but rather to show how one might productively attempt to evaluate the effect of policy and circumstance on all commitments, past and future. It may well be a way of thinking about commitment with important practical applications, but it still belongs to the realm of theory.

Moreover, even the theory has its limitations. No effort has been made to discuss the various purposes for which nations form commitments, which may of course alter their form and content. Nor has distinction been made between countries which are very threatened, like South Korea, and those which are not, like Spain. Whole groups of such particulars have simply been left aside in an effort to get to the basic issue of strength. Perhaps most important, the theory is a static one which does not allow for the identification of trends, although the analysis could be done for several years and a trend line plotted. What the theory *should* do is demonstrate that the assumption of a commitment to provide for another country's security is, particularly in the American experience, not a simple matter of just signing a treaty, but an extremely complex phenomenon with military, economic, political, psychological, and historical elements. In addition, it should prove that commitment exists on a variety of interacting levels which may or may not be aligned with each other or the national interest and which are only partly amenable to policy manipulation. And its most important lesson is that, while commitment is never involuntary, appreciation of its true nature by an alert citizenry is essential to the conduct of foreign policy in a democratic society.

TABLE

## Indicators

## I LEGAL/FORMAL

1. Number of defense agreements/  
treaty of alliance

2. Executive statements and letters

3. Congressional action

## II PHYSICAL

## A. Military

4. US military personnel abroad
5. Number of US military bases  
in country (total acreage)
6. Joint defense planning and  
organizations

## B. Economic

7. Rank among US customers;  
percent of US exports taken
8. Key commodity supplied US
9. US direct private investment
10. Foreign debt held by US banks
11. Foreign indebtedness to US  
Government

## C. Human

12. US citizens abroad

## III. BEHAVIORIAL

13. High level political interaction
14. Current annual trade with  
(surplus or deficit)
15. Current US aid (1980)
16. Total US aid (1945-1977)
17. Past response to aggression

## IV PSYCHOLOGICAL

18. Foreign born in USA
19. Percent of leaders who see US  
vital interest
20. Percent of public who:  
• see US vital interest
21. • would send troops/supplies
22. Contentious (-) or  
linkage (+) issues

MIDDLE EAST		AFRICA	
ISRAEL (1)	SAUDI ARABIA (2)	NIGERIA (3)	S. AFRICA (4)
4 Memorandum of Agree- ment (1979)	9 UN language	2 none	1 none
Israel is US #1 commit- ment in Middle East; "special relationship"	US will "go to war" to protect Saudis, defend oil supplies	none	Mondale to V & Carter to E lectures
Continuous evidence of support	Approval of pack- age plane sale	none	Pressure for US commerc policy
66 Sinai Field Mission	412 none	16 none	24 none
none	Joint Military Commission	none	none
21st 1.2%	8th 3%	27th 0.8%	25th 0.9%
none	oil	oil	chromium
\$258M	suppressed	\$335M	\$1,791M
\$616M	\$592M	\$380M	\$1,985M
\$4,178M	\$4M	\$88M	\$6M
60,296	26,445	5,156	8,030
Presidential intense \$2,017M (\$+877M)	Presidential substantial \$9,934M (\$-2,784M)	Presidential moderate \$7,054M (\$-5,138M)	Ministerial moderate \$2,323M (\$-215M)
\$1,786M	-0-	\$3M	-0-
\$10,122M	\$327M	\$409M	\$1M
October War (1973) military resupply	Yemen War (1979)	none	none
35,858	no data	no data	7,667
91%	95%	59%	62%
78%	80%	42%	63%
17%/25%	7%/27%	no data	no data
+ peace treaty	- peace treaty	+ racial dis- crimination	- apartheid
- settlements	- Iran		- Namibia

<sup>1</sup>Sources for data in Table 2 are listed in endnote 1, Section IV endnotes.

# TABLE 21. DATA ON AMERICAN COMMITMENTS

ST	AFRICA		ASIA AND FAR EAST			
SAUDI ARABIA (2)	NIGERIA (3)	S. AFRICA (4)	THAILAND (5)	TAIWAN (6)	S. KOREA (7)	SPAIN (8)
9 UN language	2 none	1 none	6 SEATO (1954) Rusk-Thanat communique' (1962)	10 Mutual Defense Treaty terminated (1980)	14 Mutual Defense Treaty (1954)	8 Treaty of Friend- ship and Cooperation (1976)
US will "go to war" to protect Saudis, defend oil supplies	none	Mondale to Vorster & Carter to Botha lectures	US "deeply com- mitted to integrity and security of Thailand"	US free to "go to war" to protect Taiwan	US to provide prompt support"; commitment "unshakable, firm, undiminished"	Spain's "full participation" would "strengthen security"
Approval of pack- age plane sale	none	Pressure for harsher US commercial policy	none	Force vs. Taiwan of "grave con- cern"; US able to "resist"	Pressure to cancel troop withdrawal	Senate reservation to 1976 treaty
412 none	16 none	24 none	104 none	none none	41,565 21 (17,955) Combined Forces Command	8,789 4 (11,974) US-Spanish Council
Joint Military Commission	none	none	none	none		
8th 3% oil suppressed \$592M \$4M	27th 0.8% oil \$335M \$380M \$88M	25th 0.9% chromium \$1,791M \$1,985M \$6M	43rd 0.4% none \$295M \$466M \$182M	18th 1.5% none \$390M \$2,470M \$1,129M	15th 2.0% none \$434M \$2,867M \$2,604M	17th 1.6% none \$2,173M \$3,460M \$1,115M
26,445	5,156	8,030	3,983	7,275	14,429	49,146
Presidential substantial \$9,934M (\$-2,784M) -0- \$327M Yemen War (1979)	Presidential moderate \$7,054M (\$-5,138M) \$3M \$409M none	Ministerial moderate \$2,323M (\$-215M) -0- \$1M none	Ministerial moderate \$860M (\$+160M) \$44M \$2,242M Vietnam War	Subcabinet infrequent \$5,479M (\$-1,883M) -0- \$6,543M Quemoy/Matsu	Ministerial intense \$5,266M (\$-524M) \$269M \$12,832M Korean War	Ministerial moderate \$2,845M (\$+905M) \$133M \$2,092M none
no data	no data	7,667	no data	172,132	38,711	57,488
95%	59%	62%	no data	55%	70%	no data
80% 7%/27% - peace treaty - Iran	42% no data + racial dis- crimination	63% no data - apartheid - Namibia	no data 10%/32% - refugees + Vietnamese threat	53% 14%/17% - PRC recognition	61% 21%/9% - troop withdrawal - human rights	no data no data + democracy

Table 2 are listed in endnote 1, Section IV endnotes.

2

# AMERICAN COMMITMENTS

ASIA AND FAR EAST			WESTERN EUROPE		
TAIWAN (6)	S. KOREA (7)		SPAIN (8)	TURKEY (9)	YUGOSLAVIA (10)
<p>10 Mutual Defense Treaty terminated (1980)</p> <p>US free to "go to war" to protect Taiwan</p> <p>Force vs. Taiwan of "grave concern"; US able to "resist"</p>	<p>14 Mutual Defense Treaty (1954)</p> <p>US to provide "prompt support"; commitment "unshakable, firm, undiminished"</p> <p>Pressure to cancel troop withdrawal</p>		<p>8 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (1976)</p> <p>Spain's "full participation" would "strengthen security"</p> <p>Senate reservation to 1976 treaty</p>	<p>11 NATO (1949)</p> <p>Priority of arms embargo repeal</p> <p>Arms embargo repeal action</p>	<p>3 none</p> <p>US "supports independence, territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia"</p> <p>none</p>
<p>none none none</p> <p>18th 1.5% none \$390M \$2,470M \$1,129M</p> <p>7,275</p>	<p>41,565 21 (17,955) Combined Forces Command</p> <p>15th 2.0% none \$434M \$2,867M \$2,604M</p> <p>14,429</p>		<p>8,789 4 (11,974) US-Spanish Council</p> <p>17th 1.6% none \$2,173M \$3,460M \$1,115M</p> <p>49,146</p>	<p>4,798 2 (955) NATO</p> <p>46th 0.4% none \$186M \$1,495M \$1,820M</p> <p>7,167</p>	<p>19 none none</p> <p>50th 0.3% none \$12M \$1,285M \$711M</p> <p>3,518</p>
<p>Subcabinet infrequent \$5,479M (\$-1,883M) -0- \$6,543M Quemoy/Matsu</p>	<p>Ministerial intense \$5,266M (\$-524M) \$269M \$12,832M Korean War</p>		<p>Ministerial moderate \$2,845M (\$+905M) \$133M \$2,092M none</p>	<p>Ministerial substantial \$569M (\$+279M) \$302M \$7,517M Truman Doctrine</p>	<p>Ministerial substantial \$692M (\$+22M) -0- \$2,822M none</p>
<p>172,132</p> <p>55%</p> <p>53% 14%/17% - PRC recognition</p>	<p>38,711</p> <p>70%</p> <p>61% 21%/9% - troop withdrawal - human rights</p>		<p>57,488</p> <p>no data</p> <p>no data no data + democracy</p>	<p>48,085</p> <p>75%</p> <p>39% 9%/29% - Cyprus + arms embargo repeal</p>	<p>153,745</p> <p>no data</p> <p>no data 18%/6% + succession</p>

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3

# TABLE 3. DATA ON AI

- Indicators*
- I. LEGAL/FORMAL
    1. Number of defense agreements/treaty of alliance
    2. Executive statements and letters
    3. Congressional action
  - II. PHYSICAL
    - A. Military
      4. US military personnel abroad
      5. Number of US military bases in country (total acreage)
      6. Joint defense planning and organizations
    - B. Economic
      7. Rank among US customers, percent of US exports taken
      8. Key commodity supplied US
      9. US direct private investment
      10. Foreign debt held by US banks
      11. Foreign indebtedness to US Government
    - C. Human
      12. US citizens abroad
  - III. BEHAVIORIAL
    13. High level political interaction
    14. Current annual trade with (surplus or deficit)
    15. Current US aid (1980)
    16. Total US aid (1945-1977)
    17. Past response to aggression
  - IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL
    18. Foreign born in USA
    19. Percent of leaders who see US vital interest
    20. Percent of public who:
      - see US vital interest
      - would send troops/supplies
    21. Contentious (-) or linkage (+) issues

MIDDLE EAST		AFRICA	
ISRAEL (1)	SAUDI ARABIA (2)	NIGERIA (3)	S. AFRICA (4)
4 Memorandum of Agreement (1979)	9 UN language	2 none	1 none
US military commitment in 1979	US military commitment in 1979	none	Mondale to Vorster & Carter to Both: lectures
Congressional action	Approval of package plane sale	none	Pressure for harsh US commercial policy
66 Sinai Field Mission	412 none	16 none	24 none
none	Joint Military Commission	none	none
21st 1.2%	27th 0.8%	27th 0.8%	25th 0.9%
none	oil	oil	chromium
\$258M	suppressed	\$335M	\$1,985M
\$616M	\$592M	\$380M	\$6M
\$2,177M	\$4M	\$88M	
10,214	26,445	5,156	8,030
High level political interaction	High level political interaction	High level political interaction	Ministerial moderate
\$2,017M (\$+877M)	\$9,934M (\$-2,784M)	\$7,054M (\$-5,138M)	\$2,323M (\$-215M)
1979	-0-	\$3M	-0-
1979	\$327M	\$409M	\$1M
October War (1973) military resupply	Yemen War (1979)	none	none
35,530	no data	no data	7,667
91%	59%	59%	62%
7%	42%	42%	63%
7%/27%	no data	no data	no data
+ peace treaty - settlements	- peace treaty - Iran	- apartheid - Namibia	- apartheid - Namibia

Table 3

The colors on this table are meant to show broad variations across each indicator significance, followed by orange and then yellow to show progressively lower level insignificant.



# TABLE 3. DATA ON AMERICAN COMMITMENTS: RANKING B

MIDDLE EAST		AFRICA		ASIA AND FAR EAST			
EL (1)	SAUDI ARABIA (2)	NIGERIA (3)	S. AFRICA (4)	THAILAND (5)	TAIWAN (6)	S. KOREA (7)	
Freedom of Agree- (1979)	9 UN language	2 none	1 none	SEATO (1954) RUS-THAI Communist (1952)	10 Mutual Defense Treaty terminated (1980)	11 Mutual Defense Treaty (1954)	S 8 T sl (1
US in commit- in Middle East al relationship	US will go to war to protect Saudi oil and oil supplies	none	Mondale to Vorster & Carter to Botha lectures	US free to "go to war" to protect Taiwan	US to provide ground support; commitment unshakable; 12th Undiminished	US to provide ground support; commitment unshakable; 12th Undiminished	S P w st
uous evidence opon	Approval of pack- age plane sale	none	Pressure for harsher US commercial policy	none	US free to "go to war" to protect Taiwan	US to provide ground support; commitment unshakable; 12th Undiminished	S t
Field Mission	412 none	16 none	24 none	104 none	none none	412 none	1 1 n \$ \$
	Joint Military Commission	none	none	none	none	Combined Forces Command	U C
	27th 0.8%	27th 0.8%	25th 0.9%	43rd 0.4%	18th 1.5%	15th 2.0%	1 1 n \$ \$
	suppressed \$592M \$4M	\$335M \$380M \$88M	\$1,985M \$6M	\$295M \$466M \$182M	\$390M \$2,470M \$1,129M	\$434M \$2,867M \$2,604M	\$ \$ \$
	26,445	5,156	8,030	3,983	7,275	14,429	4
Ministerial moderate	\$9,934M (\$-2,784M) -0- \$327M Yemen War (1979)	\$7,054M (\$-5,138M) \$3M \$409M none	Ministerial moderate \$2,323M (\$-215M) -0- \$1M none	Ministerial moderate \$860M (\$+160M) \$44M \$2,242M Vietnam War	Subcabinet infrequent \$2,242M (\$-215M) -0- \$6,543M Quemoy/Matsu	Ministerial intense \$2,242M (\$-215M) \$269M \$1,129M Not in War	M n \$ \$ \$ \$ n
	no data	no data	7,667	no data	172,132	38,711	5
	59%	59%	62%	no data	55%	70%	n
	42%	42%	63%	no data	53%	61%	n
	7%/27%	no data	no data	10%/32%	14%/17%	21%/9%	n
treaty ments	- peace treaty - Iran	- racial dis- crimination	- apartheid - Namibia	- refugees + Vietnamese threat	- PRC recognition	- troop withdrawal - human rights	+

Table 3

The colors on this table are meant to show broad variations across each indicator in the data's relative importance. Red indicates data of the highest significance, followed by orange and then yellow to show progressively lower levels of significance. No color at all means that data is unavailable or insignificant.

2

## AN COMMITMENTS: RANKING BY INDICATOR

ASIA AND FAR EAST			WESTERN EUROPE		
IND (5)	TAIWAN (6)	S. KOREA (7)	SPAIN (8)	TURKEY (9)	YUGOSLAVIA (10)
1054 Treaty terminated (1980)	10 Mutual Defense Treaty terminated (1980)	12 Mutual Defense Treaty (1954)	8 Treaty of Friend- ship and Cooperation (1976)	11 NATO (1949)	3 none
US free to "go to war" to protect Taiwan	US free to "go to war" to protect Taiwan	US to provide prompt military commitment for defense of S. Korea	Spain's "full participation" would "strengthen security"	Priority of arms embargo repeal	US "supports inde- pendence, territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia"
	US free to "go to war" to protect Taiwan	US to provide prompt military commitment for defense of S. Korea	Senate reservation to 1976 treaty	Arms embargo repeal action	none
none none none	none none none	15th 2.0% none \$434M \$2,867M \$2,604M	17th 1.6% none \$2,173M \$3,400M \$1,115M	46th 0.4% none \$186M \$1,495M \$1,820M	50th 0.3% none \$12M \$1,285M \$711M
7,275	14,429	7,167	3,518		
Subcabinet infrequent (\$10M) (1-10/91) -0- \$6,543M Quemoy/Matsu	Ministerial intense (\$10M) (1-10/91) \$269M \$1,133M \$2,092M none	Ministerial moderate \$2,845M (\$+905M) \$133M \$2,092M none	Ministerial substantial \$569M (\$+279M) \$302M \$7,517M \$1,133M	Ministerial substantial \$569M (\$+279M) \$302M \$7,517M \$1,133M	Ministerial substantial \$569M (\$+279M) \$302M \$7,517M \$1,133M
172,132	38,711	57,488	48,085	153,745	
55%	70%	no data	75%	no data	
53% 14%/17% - PRC recognition	61% 21%/9% - troop withdrawal - human rights	no data no data + democracy	39% 9%/29% - Cyprus + arms embargo repeal	no data 18%/6% + succession	

no color at all means that data is unavailable or

TABLE 4. DATA ON AMERICAN CO

Indicators		MIDDLE EAST		AFRICA	
		ISRAEL (1)	SAUDI ARABIA (2)	NIGERIA (3)	S. AFRICA (4)
I. LEGAL/FORMAL					
1	Number of defense agreements/ treaty of alliance	4 Memorandum of Agree- ment (1979)	9 UN language	2 none	1 none
2	Executive statements and letters	Israel is US #1 commit- ment in Middle East; "special relationship"	US will "go to war" to protect Saudis, defend oil supplies	none	Mondale to Vorster & Carter to Botha lectures
3	Congressional action	Continuous evidence of support	Approval of pack- age plane sale	none	Pressure for harsher US commercial policy
II. PHYSICAL					
A. Military					
4	US military personnel abroad	66	412	16	24
5	Number of US military bases in country (total acreage)	Sinal Field Misslon	none	none	none
6	Joint defense planning and organizations	none	Joint Military Commission	none	none
B. Economic					
7	Rank among US customers, percent of US exports taken	21st 1.2%		27th 0.8%	25th 0.9%
8	Key commodity supplied US	none		oil	chromium
9	US direct private investment	\$258M		\$335M	\$1,791M
10	Foreign debt held by US banks	\$616M		\$380M	\$1,985M
11	Foreign indebtedness to US Government	\$4,178M		\$88M	\$6M
C. Human					
12	US citizens abroad		26,445	5,156	8,030
III. BEHAVIORAL					
13	High level political interaction		Presidential substantial	Presidential moderate	Ministerial moderate
14	Current annual trade with (surplus or deficit)		\$9,934M (\$-2,784M)	\$7,054M (\$-5,138M)	\$2,323M (\$-215M)
15	Current US aid (1980)		-0-	\$3M	-0-
16	Total US aid (1945-1977)		\$327M	\$409M	\$1M
17	Past response to aggression		Yemen War (1979)	none	none
IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL					
18	Foreign born in USA			no data	7,667
19	Percent of leaders who see US vital interest			59%	62%
20	Percent of public who. • see US vital interest			42%	63%
21	• would send troops/supplies			no data	no data
22	Contentious (-) or linkage (+) issues			+ racial dis- crimination	- apartheid - Namibia

Table 4

The colors on this table are meant to show broad variations in the data's relative importance across data of the highest significance, followed by orange and then yellow to show progressively low unavailability or insignificant.

# 4. DATA ON AMERICAN COMMITMENTS: RANKING BY LEVEL AND SUBC

	AFRICA		ASIA AND FAR EAST			WEST	
YEMEN ARABIA (2)	NIGERIA (3)	S. AFRICA (4)	THAILAND (5)	TAIWAN (6)	S. KOREA (7)	SPAIN (8)	TURKEY (9)
Language	2 none	1 none	6 SEATO (1954) Rohm's Commitment (1950)	10 Mutual Defense Treaty terminated (1980)	14 Mutual Defense Treaty (1954)	8 Treaty of Friend- ship and Cooperation (1976)	11 NATO
Will "go to to protect s, defend plies	none	Mandate to Vorster & Carter to Botha lectures	13 US free to "go to war" to protect Taiwan	US free to "go to war" to protect Taiwan	US free to "go to war" to protect Taiwan	Spain's "full participation" would "strengthen security"	for emb
aval of pack- lane sale	none	Pressure for harsher US commercial policy	Force vs. Taiwan of "grave con- ern"; US able to "resist"	Force vs. Taiwan of "grave con- ern"; US able to "resist"	Force vs. Taiwan of "grave con- ern"; US able to "resist"	Senate reservation to 1976 treaty	Arms repe
Military mission	16 none	24 none	10s none	none none	none none	15th 2.0%	46th 0.4%
seed	27th 0.8% oil \$335M \$380M \$88M	25th 0.9% chromium \$1,791M \$1,985M \$6M	43rd 0.4% none \$295M \$466M \$182M	18th 1.5% none \$390M \$2,470M \$1,129M	15th 2.0% none \$434M \$2,867M \$2,604M	15th 2.0% none \$434M \$2,867M \$2,604M	46th 0.4% none \$186M \$1,495 \$1,820
	5,156	8,030	3,983	7,275	14,429	7,167	7,167
Minial ntial (M) War (1979)	Presidential moderate \$7,054M (\$-5,138M) \$3M \$409M none	Ministerial moderate \$2,323M (\$-215M) -0- \$1M none	Ministerial moderate \$860M (\$+160M) \$44M \$2,242M Vietnam War	Subcabinet infrequent \$5,479M (\$-1,883M) -0- \$6,543M Quemoy/Matsu	Ministerial moderate \$2,845M (\$+905M) \$133M \$2,092M none	Ministerial moderate \$2,845M (\$+905M) \$133M \$2,092M none	Ministerial moderate \$2,845M (\$+905M) \$133M \$2,092M none
	no data	7,667	no data	172,132	38,711	57,488	48,085
	59%	62%	no data	55%	70%	no data	75%
	42% no data + racial dis- crimination	63% no data - apartheid - Namibia	no data 10%/32% - refugees + Vietnamese threat	53% 14%/17% - PRC recognition	61% 21%/9% - troop withdrawal - human rights	no data + democracy	39% 9%/29% - Cypri + arms repeal

meant to show broad variations in the data's relative importance across each level or subcategory of commitment. Red indicates  
ance, followed by orange and then yellow to show progressively lower levels of significance. No color at all means that data is  
t.

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# MENTS: RANKING BY LEVEL AND SUBCATEGORY

ASIA AND FAR EAST			WESTERN EUROPE		
	TAIWAN (6)	S. KOREA (7)	SPAIN (8)	TURKEY (9)	YUGOSLAVIA (10)
	10 Mutual Defense Treaty terminated (1980)  US free to "go to war" to protect Taiwan  Force vs. Taiwan of "grave concern"; US able to "resist"	14 Mutual Defense Treaty (1954)  US to provide prompt support; commitment to defend Taiwan  US to provide prompt support; commitment to defend Taiwan	8 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (1976)  Spain's "full participation" would "strengthen security"  Senate reservation to 1976 treaty	11 NATO (1952)  NATO (1952)  NATO (1952)	3 none  US "supports independence, territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia"  none
	none none none  18th 1.5% none \$390M \$2,470M \$1,129M  7,275	15th 2.0% none \$434M \$2,867M \$2,604M  14,429	19th 0.4% none \$186M \$1,495M \$1,820M  7,167	19 none none  46th 0.4% none \$186M \$1,495M \$1,820M  7,167	50th 0.3% none \$12M \$1,285M \$711M  3,518
	Subcabinet infrequent \$5,479M (\$-1,883M) -0- \$6,543M Quemoy/Matsu		Ministerial moderate \$2,845M (\$+905M) \$133M \$2,092M none	Ministerial substantial \$692M (\$+22M) -0- \$2,822M none	
	172,132 55%  53% 14%/17% - PRC recognition	38,711 70%  61% 21%/9% - troop withdrawal - human rights	57,488  no data  no data no data + democracy	48,085  75%  39% 9%/29% - Cyprus + arms embargo repeat	153,745  no data  no data 18%/6% + succession

Subcategory of commitment. Red indicates  
cance. No color at all means that data is

2

3

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